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DANCES WITH NONLAWYERS: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON LAW FIRM 
DIVERSIFICATION 
GAR Y A. MUNNEKE * 
In this Article, Professor Munneke continues the debate over ethical rules go& 
erning lawyers' pmfes~ional aflliations with nonlawyem, arguing in fawr of the 
adoption of uniform rules that regulate lawyers'conduct in the contat of specifc 
ethical kues,  such as conjdentiality and conjlict. of interest. In Profenor Mun- 
neke's view, the retention of ethical rules that prohibit law firm divers@cation 
impedes the ability of lawyers to compete effectively in today's rapidly changing 
marketplace of prof&onal services 
Profesor Munneke moreover questions whether state bar arwciation rules that 
prohibit law firm diven1J7cation are capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny 
under the federal antitrust laws and the First Amendment. According to Profes- 
sor Munneke, a substantial question exists as to whether the state action exemp 
tion should apply to shield these rules from antitrust attack Pmfesu,r Munneke 
further asserts that First Amendment theories of freedom of association and com- 
mercial speech may impel less restrictive alternatives to the current regulatory 
scheme 
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A S the practice of law in the United States becomes increasingly com- plex, new systems for delivering legal services have proliferated. 
From legal services programs for the poor to in-house corporate law de- 
partments, lawyers have struggled to develop effective mechanisms to 
make legal services available to clients. Of the many new approaches to 
providing legal services, however, none has generated as much contro- 
* Associate Professor of Law. Pace University School of Law. 
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versy as the movement launched by a significant number of law firms to 
provide ancillary business services in conjunction with traditional legal 
services. The outcome of this battle over law firm diversification will 
shape the face of the practice of law in this country for the next century. 
This Article analyzes the current debate and proposes a resolution to this 
controversy that both ensures the long-term growth of the legal services 
industry and fosters professionalism. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Change in the Profession 
The practice of law has changed dramatically in recent decades. Re- 
search on the legal profession indicates significant shifts in the profes- 
sion's demographics1 which have served as an item of discussion in 
scholarly journals.= The problem of change and how to cope with it has 
also been addressed introspectively by bar associations which have held 
numerous conferences dealing with these  issue^.^ Moreover, this mod- 
em-day evolution has been shaped and reflected by the decisions of the 
Fundamental questions are being asked today about the practice of 
law. As the profession has grown larger in number5 and court decisions 
1. The American Bar Foundation Lawyer Statistical Report documents the growth 
of the profession from 221,605 in 1951 to 542,205 in 1980, and projections indicate thnt 
the United States will have over 1,000,000 lawyers by the year 2000. See Barbara A. 
Curran, American Bar Foundation, The Lawyer Statistical Report: A Statistical Profile 
of the U.S. Legal Profession in the 1980s, at 3-4 (1985). The profession is increasingly 
female; the female lawyer population has grown from about 5,500 in 1951 to approxi- 
mately 83,000 in 1984. See id. at 9. The percentage of sole practitioners has declined 
from about 46% in 1960 to about 33% in 1980. See id. at 14. The number of large firms 
has increased dramatically; an ABA survey shows that the number of firms with more 
than 100 lawyers has increased from four in 1960, to more than 200 in 1988. See William 
H. Rehnquist, The State of the Legal Profession, 14 Legal Econ., Mar. 1988, at 44, 44. 
2. See, e.g., Susan Raridon, The Practice of Law-The Next 50 Years, Legal Econ., 
Apr. 1989, at 31, 33 (predicting that the past "hot areas" of practice of the 1970s and 
1980s, including energy law, health care, bankruptcy, computer law, international trade, 
pensions, and tax, will give way to communications, intellectual property, employment, 
environmental, government relations, and lobbying in the 1990s, and forecasting thnt in 
the next 50 years the areas of practice will include space law, ocean law, and other areas 
not prominent today). 
3. Indeed, a central theme of many conferences on the legal profession is that the 
practice of law is changing rapidly, and that lawyers must understand the causes of such 
change in order to respond. See American Bar Ass'n, Report of the Task Force on the 
Role of the Lawyer in the 1980's, at 2 (1981); Law and the American Future (Murray L. 
Schwartz ed., 1976); William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A 
Blueprint for the Justice System in The Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 278 
(1978). 
4. See e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 353 (1977) (considering 
disciplinary rule that prohibited attorneys from advertising); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, 
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 752 (2d Cir. 1975) (considering whether 
attorney should be disqualified from court proceeding because of conflict based on former 
representation of client's adversary). 
5. The question of whether there are "too many lawyers" is not a new one. Those 
0 
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have opened the door for lawyers to use new techniques in marketing 
their servicesy6 law firms have significantly expanded the scope of the 
services they provide.' Concurrently, an increasing number of law 
school graduates have pursued careers outside the private practice of 
lawy8 frequently in fields where they utilize their legal training but are not 
required to maintain bar membership? Lawyers who have practiced in 
these fields have often tended to "legalize" their work by using a legal 
approach to analysis and problem solving. In some areas of practice, 
lawyers may eventually push nonlawyers out of the field. 
who claim that the practice of law is overcrowded always seem to represent a view that 
the late Professor Robert McKav described as "the last lawver into the room. shut the 
door." Remarks at the National -Conference on the Role of thk Lawyer in the 1980s (Jan. 
1980). See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
6. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) 
(letterhead designation of specialty); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 
626 (1985) (advertising); I n  re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (same); Bates, 433 U.S. at 350 
( m e ) .  
7. The fact that legal advice incorporates extralegal elements is acknowledged in the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 (1984) [hereinnfter hlodd Rules]. "In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and 
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to 
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that m y  be 
relevant to the client's situation." Id Comments to this rule state as follows: 
Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of 
another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the profes- 
sional competence of psychiatry, cliical psychology or social work; business 
matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profes- 
sion or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in an- 
other field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer 
should make such a recommendation. 
Model Rules, supra, Rule 2.1 cmt. This admonition implicitly recognizes the notion that 
legal problems are seldom purely legal problems, and that the resolution of complex is- 
sues usually requires more than purely legal advice. See Raidon, supra note 2, at 33. 
8. The 1988 Employment Report and Salary Survey produced by the Na t iod  Asso- 
ciation for Law Placement indicates that 4.8% of law school graduates responding to the 
survey were employed in full-time nonlegal positions. See National Ass'n for Law P h u -  
ment, Class of 1988 Employment Report and Salary Survey 1 (1990). Although the term 
"nonlegal" is imprecise, it is clear that many law grnduntes do not pnct iu  hw. There 
are no competent sources of information on how many practicing lawyers leave the active 
practice of law, but extrapolation from the 1980 Statistid Report and legal education 
statistics suggests that the actual number is substantial. Another survey in 1985 found 
that 13% of all law school graduates held nonlegal positions. See Leona M. Vogt, From 
Law School to Career: Where Do Graduates Go And What Do They Do? A Career 
Paths Study of Seven Northeastern Area Law Schools 9 (1986). Furthermore, an ABA 
Young Lawyers Division survey found that 7.8% of the respondents intended to change 
jobs outside of law within the next two years. See Ronald L. Hirsch, Are You on Target?, 
12 Barrister, Witer  1985, at 17, 18. Whether these lawyers actually left the profession is 
unknown. 
9. These "law-related" careers include a number of fields utilizing legal training but 
not requiring bar membership such as accounting/= low and real estate. See generally 
Frances Utley with Gary A. Mumeke, Nonlegal Careers for Lawyers: In the Private 
Sector (2d ed. 1984) (discussing alternative career pathsk Deborah I. Armn, Running 
From the Law: Why Good Lawyers Are Getting Out of the Legal Profession (1989) 
(nonlegal career alternatives); Ellen Wayne, National Ass'n for Law Placement. Legal 
Careers: Choices and Options (1982) (alternative w e e r  paths). 
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Just as lawyers have entered many nonlegal professions, a substantial 
number of nonlegal enterprises now offer law-related services.1° Fre- 
quently, these service providers compete with law firms for the same cli- 
ents and work. In some areas they have squeezed out the legal 
practitioners. 'I 
The result of these developments has been a blurring of the line be- 
tween that which is the practice of law and that which is not. Although 
lawyers retain a monopoly on the representation of clients in court, many 
other services are up for grabs.I2 Ironically, lawyers in private practice 
often find themselves competing with other lawyers who are employed by 
nonlegal organizations. The response of some firms has been to hire 
nonlawyers with expertise in law-related areas to help them compete ef- 
fectively against nonlegal business entities. 
Historically, the organized bar has challenged competing nonlegal ven- 
tures by attacking them as having engaged in the unauthorized practice 
of law.I3 The bar associations in many jurisdictions created unauthor- 
ized practice committees to monitor the activities of nonlegal organiza- 
tions that have encroached upon the domain of practicing lawyers.I4 
10. h an^ certified public accounting firms provide a tax section comprised of legally 
trained individuals who support the delivery of accounting services to clients. Although 
the tax section is not considered to be engaged in the practice of law, there is nevertheless 
an overlap between the tax planning work of C.P.A.3 and the legal tax work of lawyers. 
See Utley with Munneke, supra note 9, at 18-19,44. As another example, banks operate 
trust departments in which the trust management functions frequently have legal over- 
tones. If the bankers, who are often lawyers, also assist clients with financial planning, 
they are likely to engage in work similar to that of a single practitioner. See id. at 22. 
Likewise, insurance companies that provide estate planning services may do almost 
everything that lawyers do, short of drafting wills and trusts. See id. 
11. The most obvious example is in the real property field. In many jurisdictions, title 
companies have absorbed the bulk of residential real estate transfers by providing a less 
expensive service than lawyers. Practicing lawyers have lost the real estate market for all 
but the most complicated, adversarial, or large closings. See Gary Taylor, Practicing Law 
on the Borderline, Nat'l L.J., May 28, 1990, at 3, 3. 
12. See generally Virginia State Bar v. Surety Title Ins. Agency, 571 E2d 205 (4th 
Cir.) (dispute regarding state bar association's proper role in adopting and enforcing dis- 
ciplinary rules concerning the unauthorized practice of law), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 941 
(1978); In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910) ("corporation can neither 
practice law nor hire lawyers to carry on the business of practicing law for it"). 
13. See Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fe~ces 
Really Make Good Neighbors--or Even Good Sense?, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 159, 
160 (1980); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Prof5ssional Monopoly: A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1981). 
Although Christensen and Rhode differ somewhat in their views as to when the organ- 
ized bar became aggressively involved in the enforcement of unauthorized practice regu- 
lations, both agree that the protection of lawyers' economic interests has been a major 
tenet of the bar's agenda for approximately 50 years. The ABA was one of the first 
organizations to outlaw, and then police, the unauthorized practice of law. It formed a 
Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law to perform thesc functions. 
See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has tfte 
Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 Hastings L.J. 577, 583 (1989). 
14. From 1937 through 1978, the ABA Standing Committee on the Unauthorized 
Practice of Law formulated "Statements of Principles" concerning accountants, archi- 
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These committees have fallen into disfavor, however, for a number of 
reasons including a series of legal setbacks,15 the threat of antitrust chal- 
lenge posed by the Federal Trade C~mmission,~~ and the increasingly 
unclear distinction between the practice of law and the pursuit of related 
fields.'' In the wake of these committees, a more laissez-faire, free mar- 
ket environment has evolved.18 In this new environment, both lawyers 
and nonlawyers have experimented extensively with new delivery 
systems. lg 
In order to appreciate this movement by law firms towards ancillary 
business ventures, it is important to understand the changes in the legal 
profession that have occurred in recent years. For much of the nine- 
teenth and twentieth centuries, the vast majority of lawyers practiced 
alone or in very small firms.20 These lawyers offered services that were 
personal to their clients.21 Clients tended to hire lawyers on the basis of 
personal loyalties. Increasingly, however, the attorney-client relation- 
ship has become more institutional than personal.* Along with the de- 
tects, banks, claims adjusters, collection agencies, insurers, engineers, publishers, title 
companies, realtors, and social workers that charted the appropriate sphere of activities 
for each profession in relation to the legal profession. These efforts were designed to 
ensure than nonlawyers did not practice law. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 584. 
15. See Rhode, supra note 13, at 55-62. 
16. Many statements of principles formulated by the ABA were rescinded because of 
successful antitrust challenges. See James Podgers, Statements of Principles Are They on 
the Way Out?, 66 A.B.A. J. 129, 129 (1980). "[Ninety-six percent] of state bar issocia- 
tions had unauthorized practice committees in 1976." Rhode, supra note 13, at 15. Ac- 
cording to the chairman of the ABA's unauthorized practice committee, this puccatage 
has decreased primarily because of antitrust concerns. See id 
17. See David Lauter, 'Outsiders' Who Work for Em, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 6, 1984, at 1, 
32 (discussion with consultant Robert Weil) ("In the past . . . 'the psychology of the 
profession' has been to 'step back from the l i e '  separating law from other fields. More 
recently, that reticence has been diminishing."). 
18. See i d  (discussion with regulatory economist Jim J. Tozzi) (" 'Maw is incres- 
ingly multidisciplinary,'. . . requiring 'a range of services' to represent a client. 'Econo- 
mists and any of these others,' [accountants, lobbyists, engineers, etc] . . . 'were always 
brought in on an ad hoc basis, but if you're an integral part of the firm, it adds another 
dimension.' "); Rosalind Resnick, Looking at Alternative Services-The Lowyer/Non-law- 
yer Wall Continues to Erode, Nat'l L.J., June 10, 1991, at 1; Taylor, supra note 11, at 3. 
19. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
20. See Curran, supra note 1, at 13. 
21. During the first two- th i i  of this century, the legal profession wns a "close-knit 
fraternity of like-minded practitioners who shared a strong sense of common values and a 
general disdain for any efforts to commercialize the profession." James W. Jones, The 
Challenge of Change: The Practice of Luw in the Year 2000,41 Vand. L. Rev. 683, 683 
(1988). Lawyers believed that law, as a profession, was "a branch of the administration 
of justice and not a mere money-getting trade." Id  at 683-84. "The loyalty lnnryus felt 
toward their firms was mirrored by the fidelity of their clients, who valued stability over 
cost effectiveness." S.S. Samuelson & L.J. Jaffe, A Statistical Analysis of Low Finn Pro~t-  
ability, 70 B.U. L. Rev. 185, 189 (1990). 
22. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Reorganization of the Legal Profmion, 58 Tex. L 
Rev. 1269, 127479 (1980). Professor Schwartz discusses a number of negative effects 
produced by this "bureaucratization of the legal profession," including the change in 
lawyer loyalty from clients to employers, see id at 1278-79, the "attenuation of the Id 
general professional community as the lawyer's reference group for norms of practice and 
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personalization of client services, a more permissive marketing 
environmentz3 has encouraged law firms to expand their services in 
search of new ~lients.'~ 
Competition and shrinking profits have further applied pressure on 
law firms to find new sources of reven~e.'~ Clients have reinforced this 
businesslike environment by demonstrating less loyalty to preexisting 
professional relationships, and changing firms when the price is right.26 
Many law firms have responded to the competitive atmosphere of the 
1980s by broadening the scope of the services they offer. Often this has 
resulted in an expansion of services beyond the practice of law. One ex- 
ample of this is the creation of estate planning departments that service 
the needs of general business or litigation clients. Frequently, this has 
also produced a broadening of the scope of services offered to clients in 
general. The law firm, for example, to further service a client engaged in 
lobbying activities, might make available the skills of research analysts, 
economists and other consultants in conjunction with the services offered 
by the legal team. Moreover, in a commercial land acquisition, the law 
firm might supply a variety of professionals including engineers and envi- 
ronmental consultants to expedite the deal. 
It is a commonly accepted practice for a law firm to go into the mar- 
ketplace and purchase nonlegal expertise to provide competent services 
for individual  client^.^' Little controversy is generated when a law firm 
retains a salaried professional to provide a specific nonlegal service to a 
professionalism . . . [and the] decline in self regulation of the bar." Id. at 1269. Compnre 
Professor Schwartz' assessment of the demise of professionalism to that of former ABA 
President Justin Stanley, who chaired the ABA Commission on Professionnlism. See 
Justin A. Stanley, Lawyers In Business, 8 N .  111. U. L. Rev. 17, 22 (1987) ("[Llnwyers 
and law firms seem to be drifting from an attitude of professionalism toward one of com- 
mercialism."); id. at 26. 
23. Although Supreme Court cases such as Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 
350 (1977), speak of advertising, a concept that many practitioners resisted, the buzzword 
"marketing" did not bring with it the same connotations of sleazy ambulance chnsing. 
Advertising is one approach to marketing legal services, but every lawyer or law firm that 
seeks to find new clients or retain old ones engages in marketing, regardless of whether 
advertising is used or not. This shift in thinking and the implications generated by it were 
first observed by Lori Andrews in her groundbreaking work. See Lori B. Andrews, Birth 
of a Salesman: Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation 85 (1980) [hereinafter Birth of a 
Salesman]. 
24. See Kathy Brock, Competition is the Catchword for Professional Services, The 
Business Journal-Portland, January 7, 1991, at 11; W. Ward Reynoldson, The Case 
Against Lawyer Advertising, 75 A.B.A. J. 60 (1989). 
25. See Donna K.H. Walters, Partners Under Pressure, L.A. Times, July 7, 1991, at 
Dl .  A new source of income for many firms has been the providing of ancillary services, 
such as economists and lobbyists, to clients. Law firms face a growing demand from 
increasingly sophisticated clients who are shopping harder for law firms to provide 
broader services. See Thomas E Gibbons, Law Practice in 2001, 76 A.B.A. J. 68 (1990). 
26. "More sophisticated clients are diwying up their business to several service prov- 
iders based on specialties . . . rather than using one firm for all of their services-a trend 
observers expect will continue." Brock, supra note 24, at 13. 
27. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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class of clients with similar needs.28 When the nonlegal services, how- 
ever, extend beyond mere contract work or employment arrangements, 
the role of nonlawyers expands and many lawyers become very ner- 
v o ~ s . * ~  The current debate on ancillary business activities arises in to- 
day's competitive environment. Each side in this debate has its own view 
of the proper nature of the lawyer-client relationship. Before further ex- 
amining this debate in Section 111, it may be helpful to review the regula- 
tory framework governing the lawyer-client relationship and examine 
some of the experimental arrangements that have been employed by law- 
yers to expand the scope of their services within a confining regulatory 
scheme. 
B. Regulation of the Marketplace 
Law firms that wish to provide legal and nonlegal services to clients do 
not enter a regulatory vacuum. Ethical rules restrict the ability of law 
firms to provide services ancillary to the practice of law. This regulatory 
net defines the types of arrangements that law firms may establish. 
Lawyers are hampered in their efforts to diversify by traditional no- 
tions of law practice and by longstanding ethical prohibitions against 
business entanglements with n~nlawyers .~~ Ethical rules provide that a 
lawyer may not "form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activ- 
ities of the partnership consist of the practice of law."31 In addition, the 
lawyer may not "share legal fees with a non la~yer , "~~  give anything of 
value to a nonlawyer for recommending the lawyer's services,33 or permit 
28. See Andrews, supra note 13; Lauter, supra note 17. 
29. An example of this fear may be found in a message from ABA President Stanley 
L. Chauvin to members of the association: 
m h e  mixing of law practice with non-law business could open the flood gatcs 
for outside regulation of the profession. . . . I truly doubt that lawyers who 
create ancillary businesses are motivated by a desire to serve clients or the pub- 
lic more effectively. . . . The risk of putting the lawyer-client relationship in 
jeopardy appears to be motivated by profit. 
Stanley L. Chauvin, Jr., A Conscientious Conclusion: Ancillary Business roo Risky for 
Clients and Lawyers (Message from the President), 76 A.B.A. J. 8, 8-9 (1990). 
30. Although the Model Rules and the predecessor Model Code of Professional Re- 
sponsibility (1969) [hereinafter Model Code] do not prohibit all business combinations 
involving lawyers and nonlawyers, one treatise notes: 
While the Comment to Model Rule 5.4 asserts that the Rule expresses mdi- 
tional Sitations on sharing fees, to protect the lawyers* professional judge- 
ment, substantial portions of Rule 5.4 are best read cis a continuation of an 
attempt to restrict lawyers and nonlawyers from working together if legal serv- 
ices will be rendered in the joint venture. 
1 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal hlalpnctice 256 n.7 (3d ed. 1989). 
31. Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.w); Model Code. supra note 30, DR 3- 
103(A). 
32. Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a); Model Code. supra note 30. DR 3- 
102(A). 
33. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.2(c); Model Code, supra note 30. DR 2- 
103(B). 
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a nonlawyer to direct the lawyer's independent professional judgment.34 
Moreover, the lawyer may not practice in an association authorized to 
practice law for a profit, if: "(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, 
. . .; (2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or (3) a 
nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of 
a lawyer."35 Furthermore, the lawyer shall not assist a non-lawyer to 
engage in the unauthorized practice of law.36 In addition, rules that re- 
strict in-person solicitation of business3' and protect client  confidence^^^ 
necessarily place limitations on lawyers7 dealings with nonlawyers. Col- 
lectively, these rules have kept lawyers out of nonlegal activities, and 
have likewise kept nonlawyers from providing legal services.3g 
These regulations are now giving way to more permissive rules gov- 
erning joint lawyer-nonlawyer ventures, and such activities appear to be 
evolving with or without the imprimatur of the organized bar.* Part I1 
of this Article reviews the current debate over lawyers' ancillary business 
34. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5 .q~) ;  Model Code, supra note 30, DR 5- 
107(B). 
35: Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.qd); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 5- 
- . .. 
107(C). 
36. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.5(b); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3- 
101(A). 
37. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.3; Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2- 
103(A). 
38. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.6; Model Code, supra note 30, DR 4101. 
39. See Harry J. Haynsworth, Marketing and Legal Ethics: The Rules and Risks 120 
(rev. ed. 1990); Andrews, supra note 13, at 600. Both Dean Haynsworth and Professor 
Andrews conclude that this regulatory net has been effective in preventing joint business 
ventures between lawyers and nonlawyers for the providing of legal services. 
40. Both the District of Columbia and North Dakota have considered a plan to allow 
nonlawyer participation in law firms. The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the 
following bar recommendation that was designed to liberalize Model Rule 5.4 so as to 
allow the sharing of fees, and the formation of partnerships with nonlawyers, provided 
that certain ethical safeguards were maintained: 
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except 
that: 
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partners, or associate may 
provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the 
lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons; 
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a de- 
ceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of 
the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the de- 
ceased lawyer; and 
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation 
or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on the 
profit-sharing arrangement. 
@) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activi- 
ties of the partnership consist of the practice of law. 
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the 
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's 
professional judgment in rendering such legal services. 
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation 
or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if: 
(1) A nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representn- 
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activities. It remains to be seen whether the organized bar can formulate 
workable solutions to this intractable problem, given the divergence of 
opinion that prevails. Regardless of what the formal bar ultimately de- 
cides, new delivery systems will continue to be forged by entrepreneurial 
lawyers.41 To the extent that these innovative practices infringe upon 
traditional concepts of the nature of lawyering, new rules may be ham- 
mered out by court decisions when these practices are challenged. 
Frequently, careful planning allows lawyers who engage in joint ven- 
tures with nonlawyers to traverse the ethical obstacle course unscathed. 
In practice, the ethical rules have proved to be mere snares for the un- 
wary, not barriers to all ancillary business activity, and, as a result, inno- 
vative practice arrangements have continued to develop.42 
There are strong arguments for the repeal of some, if not all, of the 
tive of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a 
reasonable time during administration; 
(2) A nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or 
(3) A nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of 
a lawyer. 
North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 (Proposed Draft 1986). 
The District of Columbia Court of Ap@ has adopted a rule permitting nonlawyers 
to become partners in law firms: 
(a)(4) Sharing of fees is permitted in a partnership or other form of orgmim- 
tion which meets the requirements of Paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organizntion in 
which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an 
individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the or- 
ganization in providing legal services to clients, but only if: 
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal serv- 
ices to clients; 
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a linmcial interest 
undertake to abide by these Rules of Professiod Conduct; 
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the 
partnership or organization undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer par- 
ticipants to the same extent as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under 
Rule 5.1; 
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing. 
District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4(a)(4), (b) (1990). 
41. See Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n, 738 F. Supp. 288,290 (N.D. 111. 1990) (unin- 
corporated association of lawyers, paralegals and lay persons that mwered legal ques- 
tions of the general public), a y d ,  956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992); Florida Bar v. 
Consolidated Business and Legal Forms, Inc., 386 So. 2d 797,798-99 (Fla. 1980) (com- 
pany owned entirely by nonlawyers that employed both lawyers and lay persons to de- 
liver legal services to the general public); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Gold Shield, 
Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1232, 1233-34 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1975) (group legal services plan whereby 
member lawyers were made available to provide legal services to subscribers of the plan). 
42. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, More than the Law: Ancillary Business Growth Con- 
tinues, 78 A.B.A. J. 54, 56 (1992) (discussing the steps law firms have taken to avoid 
problems including conflict checks, disclosure statements, and special retention agree- 
ments). Despite the obstacles, firms with ancillary businesses represent "a growing move- 
ment. A 1991 survey by Phyllis \Veiss Haserot, president of Nerv Yorlr's Practice 
Development Counsel, identified 80-85 ancillary businesses operated by law firms-up 
from about 65 in 1989." Id at 55. 
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rules that govern lawyers' business relationships with n~nlawyers .~~ 
Most notably, a removal of the economic restrictions resulting from the 
current rules could allow lawyers to compete more effectively in the free 
market environment of today's business world. Such changes might ac- 
tually help law h s  survive in the coming decades. 
C. Experimentation in the Marketplace 
It has long been commonplace for small town lawyers to engage in 
ancillary business activities. These businesses have often been operated 
out of the same office as the law pra~tice.~" Office sharing arrangements 
with nonlegal businesses, where a lawyer and a nonlawyer share clients, 
if not fees, have also been cornmonpla~e.~~ In the past, professional disci- 
pline was periodically meted out against lawyers who used these arrange- 
ments to solicit clients indirectly by feeding the law practice with clients 
from the ancillary business.46 For the most part, such practices were 
ignored by disciplinary officials provided that the lawyer's conduct was 
not egregi~us.~' 
In a small town, where there might not be enough legal work to keep 
lawyers busy full-time:* some relaxation of the rules against affiliations 
with nonlawyers has served a practical purpose. By permitting lawyers 
to engage in ancillary business activities and thereby supplement the in- 
come they received from their law practice, legal services have been made 
available to people who would otherwise not have access to a lawyer.49 
In larger communities, where the competition has been greater and 
there has been enough legal work to sustain full-time law practices, many 
of the reasons that make ancillary businesses attractive in small towns do 
43. See infra part 11. 
44. See Haynsworth, supra note 39, at 80. 
45. It would be impossible to catalogue all the different business arrangements involv- 
ing small-town lawyers and providers of nonlaw services. A lawyer might own a real 
estate or insurance agency. A real estate law firm might own a title company or maintain 
an interest in a local bank. A lawyer who was also a certified public accountant might 
operate a joint law/accounting practice. A real estate or insurance agency, instead of 
being operated by the lawyer, could simply occupy a suite in the same office building, and 
perhaps share support staff and overhead expenses. A car ride through almost any rural 
county evinces the prevalence of these practices. An interesting description of the phe- 
nomenon appears in the Litigation Section Recommendation and Report to the House of 
Delegates on Ancillary Business Activities of Lawyers (1990). Although the Litigation Sec- 
tion opposed the idea of ancillary business generally, the Report carved out a small town 
exception because the practice was so entrenched. See id. at 3, A-7. 
46. See In re Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76, 78-81, 86, a r d ,  521 P.2d 497 (Alaska 1974); 
Florida Bar v. Curry, 21 1 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 981 (1968); In re 
Depew, 524 P.2d 163, 164-66 (Idaho 1974); In re Miller, 131 N.E.2d 91, 93-95, 97 (Ill. 
1955). 
47. See John P. Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Struc- 
ture of the Bar 345-46,350 (1982). The close-knit legal community in a small town could 
enforce informally what the formal disciplinary process ignored. Such cohesiveness is 
absent in more urban settings. See id. at 346-47, 350. 
48. See Haynsworth, supra note 39, at 80. 
49. See id. 
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not exist. Urban lawyers have tended to view attempts by their counter- 
parts to diversify into nonlegal or law-related businesses as being a form 
of unfair competition. Before the ban on legal advertising was declared 
unconstitutional, any foray by law firms into business ventures that could 
generate new clients for the firm was considered une th i~a l .~  Even after 
the Bates decision," there remained an undercurrent of feeling among 
lawyers that extra-legal services were unprofessional. As a result of this 
dichotomy between large and small communities, a regulatory scheme 
has been maintained despite the fact that its provisions seldom have been 
enforced in smaller comrnunitie~.~~ Thus, there has been a double stan- 
dard of enforcement. 
Ironically, the same ethical considerations confront both the sole prac- 
titioner and the large law firm partner. Problems involving loyalty, con- 
fidentiality, and solicitation apply with equal force to the small and large 
firm. The only distinctions between the two lie in the economic stakes. 
If small firms and sole practitioners are able to engage in ancillary busi- 
ness activities without violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, then 
large firms should be able to do the same. But ethical pitfalls do exist, 
and arguably these are more pronounced in larger organizations. The 
better solution may be to regulate lawyers' conduct in the context of spe- 
cific ethical issues, such as confidentiality, rather than prohibiting 
prophylactically an entire genre of associations. 
Separate standards should not be employed for ancillary businesses o p  
erated by large and small law firms. If there are no valid reasons for 
prohibiting small firms from engaging in ancillary business ventures, it 
follows that no absolute bar should be imposed upon large firms either. 
More importantly, the distinctions between sole practitioners and large 
firms, or between small towns and big cities, are analytically meaningless. 
The fact that an issue is more pressing in one setting than another does 
not lead to the conclusion that different rules are necessary. Although 
conflicts of interest may be more diicult to identify in a firm of five 
hundred attorneys than in a firm of five, the standard for determining 
when a firm should withdraw or be disqualified should not differ.s3 
Similarly, the distinction between law-related and nonlegal business 
activities should be discarded. Although the dividing line between "non- 
50. See B i  of a Salesman, supra note 23, at 1. 
51. The Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368-72 (1977). dis- 
cussed "The Adverse Effect on Professionalism" as one of the arguments offered by the 
Bar Association in support of retaining the ban on advertising. The Court's response 
clearly articulates its antipathy towards the Bar's position. Bates, however, did not put to 
rest the sentiment that professionalism was under attack. 
52. See supra note 47 and accompanying text 
53. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 
1975), dealt with the confiict of interest problems inherent in large law firms. Neither the 
Code nor the Rules mentions any special provisions applicable to lawyers practicing in 
large or small firms. The court in Silver Chrysler PIymouth does, however, acknowledge 
that associates in large firms may not have access to confidential information in such a 
manner that would later require their personal disqualification. See id at 756-57. 
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legal" and "law-related" is obscure at best, some of the enterprises com- 
monly referred to as law-related include real estate agencies, insurance 
agencies, investigation agencies, and accounting firms.54 
A practicing lawyer engaged in a business venture extrinsic to the 
practice of law should be careful not to allow that venture or its clients to 
interfere with his professional responsibilities to the law practice or its 
clients. The lawyer must conduct her law practice according to the stan- 
dards of the applicable Rules or Code, and conform her conduct outside 
the practice to standards of integrity and hone~ty.'~ The lawyer's busi- 
ness activities, as well as personal conduct, may be subject to constraints 
imposed by the ethical standards. This is true regardless of whether the 
activity is characterized as legal or law-related. 
It is virtually impossible to draw a meaningful line between nonlegal 
and law-related activities. Although some activities could be character- 
ized as law-related more easily than others, it is difficult to imagine any 
activity that could not be considered law-related under any circumstance 
because almost every field of human endeavor has some legal ramifica- 
tion. In the absence of a meaningful distinction between lawyers' respon- 
sibilities vis-8-vis nonlegal and law-related work, line drawing becomes a 
true exercise in futility. The rest of this Article, therefore, will not dwell 
on this distinction, but rather will refer to all business activities by law- 
yers outside of the practice of law as "nonlegal." 
The most common form of ancillary business activity occurs when the 
lawyer or law firm owns a nonlegal business. The lawyer may or may not 
have partners or joint venturers for the nonlegal enterprise. The nonlegal 
business, moreover, may or may not operate in conjunction with the law 
business. In addition, advice that the lawyer gives to clients or customers 
of the nonlegal business will contain varying degrees of legal content and 
thereby subject the nonlegal business to prosecution for the unauthorized 
practice of law. The critical element in each situation is that the lawyer 
is in a position to exercise control over the policy or management of the 
nonlegal bu~iness.'~ The lawyer need not be involved in the actual man- 
agement of the business, but, in any event, the lawyer's financial invest- 
ment would place him in a position to exercise control." 
54. Arguably, in the law-related scenarios the nexus between the two fields of work is 
close enough that clients of the law-related activity might become clients of the legal 
practice. In a nonlegal business, on the other hand, there is no connection with the legal 
business (e.g., a practicing lawyer may own a restaurant). This distinction unfortunately 
confuses rather than clarifies the situation. 
55. See I n  re Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76, 85 (Alaska), afld on reh'g, 521 P.2d 497 
(Alaska 1974). 
56. Thus, mere financial investment in a company, such as the purchase of non-con- 
trolling shares of stock, would not fall within the scope of this definition. 
57. The Model Rules do not prohibit lawyer investment in outside business. A law 
firm may own its building and rent out space in it, operate a restaurant or travel agency, 
or invest in all manner of unrelated businesses. Model Rule 1.8 provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or know- 
ingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest ad- 
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When a lawyer engages in a nonlegal business, various ethical issues 
arise in addition to the general duties of honesty and integrity. Included 
among these are such ethical issues as unauthorized practice, conflicts of 
interest, confidentiality, and solicitation. The nonlegal business presents 
a potential threat to the integrity of the legal profession because it ex- 
poses lawyers to an opportunity to violate their professional ethics. But, 
as is the case with conflicts of interest in general, a potential conflict does 
not necessarily require withdrawal or clisqualifi~ation.~~ 
A subset of the lawyer-owned, nonlegal business is the joint practice, 
where the lawyer herself is certi6ed in another field such as accounting, 
real estate or medicine.59 In the course of an interview with one client, 
the lawyer may simply change hats, or vice versa. While dual training 
permits a lawyer to provide a broader range of services, traditionally it 
was feared that a dual practice would allow lawyers to improperly funnel 
nonlegal clients to the law practice. As Dean Haynsworth has noted, 
however, many earlier restrictions against dual practice have given way 
verse to a client unless: (1) the transaction and terms on which the lnwycr 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed 
and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonnbly 
understood by the client; (2) the client is given a reasonnble opportunity to seek 
the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and (3) the client consents 
in writing thereto. 
Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.8(a). Thus, business dealings with clients m y  be 
subject to discipline. The conflict involves the clients' interests, not the joint venture per 
se. The joint venture, however, is explicitly prohibited to the extent thnt a lnwyer m y  
not make a nonlawyer a partner in a law practice. See Model Rules, supm note 7, Rule 
5.4(b),(d). These same rules apply when the law firm enters into a business relationship 
with a nonlegal business such as a title company or investigator. Other concerns, how- 
ever, including conflicts, confidentiality, and improper solicitation, render the lawyer's 
business dealings with his clients susceptible to criticism in additional mys. 
58. Perhaps the best approach is to view ancillary businesses as conflicts. The Model 
Code contains the clearest statement of this concept in DR 5-101(A) which states: 
Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not 
accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgement on behalf of his 
client will be or reasonably may be affected by hi own financial, business, prop 
erty, or personal interests. 
Model Code, supra note 30, DR 5-101(A). The hlodel Rules also address outside busi- 
ness activities in Rule 1.7: 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of thnt client m y  
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to mother client or to a 
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably 
believes the representation will not be adversely affected, and (2) the client con- 
sents after consultation. 
Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.7(b). Under a conflict of interest analysis, a lawyer 
would be required to both ascertain whether the activity in question compromised my 
ethical duties to present or former clients, and obtain the aEected clients' consent. See 
Model Rules, supm note 7, Rules 1.7, 1.9. 
59. One of the first medical-legal law firms in the country was formed in the early 
1980s, in which all the partners had both J.D. and hf.D. degrees, and continued to pnc- 
tice their medical specialties as well as the law. See Gail Appleson, Combining L a w  and 
Medicine, Nat'l L.J., May 16, 1983, at 10. 
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to a more permissive rule.60 
A variation on the joint practice theme is the office sharing arrange- 
ment, where the legal and nonlegal activities are independently owned 
and operated. Suppose ABC law firm shares office space with XYZ con- 
sulting group. XYZ employs a number of consultants and ABC engages 
primarily in business planning work. Although each entity operates 
under its own lease, an overlapping management team provides common 
support services such as word processing, reception and billing. Is it a 
problem if ABC and XYZ informally refer clients to each other, or if 
ABC utilizes consultants employed by XYZ as experts in its cases? 
Probably not. 
In this example of an informal arrangement, the law firm may be able 
to avoid transgressing any of the rules that pertain to its business deal- 
ings with n~nlaqryers.~~ If, however, the law firm and consulting practice 
were to share fees formally, or form a partnership, the arrangement 
would be ethically impermissible for the lawyers.62 Such a venture 
would subject the lawyers to disciplinary action even if the arrangement 
were more economically viable than the informal arrangement described 
above. 
Suppose instead that ABC law firm holds an economic or controlling 
interest in the consulting group.'j3 As long as the law firm does not vio- 
late any ethical rules, particularly those covering dealings with nonlaw- 
yers, such an arrangement would be permi~sible.~~ 
Similarly, the law firm could hire the consultants as employees of the 
firm to do work in conjunction with the firm's cases, and could even 
share profits through a qualified pension or profit sharing plan.'j5 Yet, 
the law firm could not give the consultants a share of its legal fees,66 and 
arguably could not take a share of any consulting fees for services pro- 
vided independently by the  consultant^.^' 
These scenarios illustrate the unusual constraints dictated by the pres- 
ent rules. Lawyers walk an ethical tightrope whenever they contemplate 
60. See Haynsworth, supra note 39, at 121. 
61. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rules 5.4, 5.5; Model Code, supra note 30, canon 
3. 
62. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a), (b); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 
3-102(A), DR 3-103(A). 
63. This example is, in fact, an ancillary business. 
64. The converse, of course, would not be true because nonlawyers are prohibited 
from holding an economic interest in a law firm. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 
5.4(d)(l); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 5-107(C)(l). 
65. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a)(3); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3- 
102(AM3). 
66.''S;.e Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3- 
102(A). 
67. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3- 
102(A). This particular proposition may be the subject of some debate, the counterargu- 
ment being that the firm is not improperly sharing fees with the ancillary business since 
none of the activities of the nonlegal business involve the practice of law. 
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any form of multiprofessional practice, and the plight becomes more pre- 
carious when they cede power and income to nonlawyers. At the same 
time, sophisticated practitioners can devise ways to avoid taking an ethi- 
cal fall while deriving substantially all of the benefits of a joint venture. 
Looking at the situation in reverse, it is well settled that a lawyer who 
is employed by a nonlegal entity cannot provide any legal services to 
clients of that nonlegal ~rganization.~' For instance, a J.D.K.P.A. in 
partnership with another C.P.A. could not offer legal services to the 
C.P.A. firm's clients, although he could give legal advice to the account- 
ing partnership itself. Moreover, the nonlegal organization could not 
own or invest in the law practice.69 Furthermore, ethical rules prohibit 
partners in a law firm from selling their practice to a C.P.A. f irm.'O 
In summary, under the present regulatory scheme law firms can oper- 
ate subsidiaries that provide nonlegal services. Law firms, however, can- 
not operate in such a way that they themselves offer both legal and 
nonlegal services, except where those nonlegal services are ancillary to 
the practice of law. Nonlawyer ownership of or control over the delivery 
of legal services is generally prohibited. Thus, true multiprofessional of- 
fices remain beyond the range of feasibility, despite the fundamental a p  
peal of the concept of holistic problem solving centers." 
A separate question related to nonlawyer participation in law firms has 
arisen in a sphere separate from the delivery of legal services, namely, the 
area of law firm management. As law firms have grown larger and more 
complex, lawyers have learned (sometimes the hard way) that adminis- 
tering the law firm interferes with practicing law. Increasingly, lawyers 
have employed professional managers to handle administrative responsi- 
bilities previously directed by  attorney^.'^ Hiring nonlawyer profession- 
als to manage the firm presents some of the same problems as hiring staff 
professionals to support the delivery of legal services. Law firm manag- 
ers inevitably gain control over important policy decisions of the 
and this may constitute control over the lawyers' independent profes- 
sional judgment. Professional level administrators are likely to expect 
financial incentives beyond straight salary, and this may be viewed as fee- 
68. See In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910); Haynsworth, supra note 
39, at 97-98. 
69. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(b), (d); Model Code, supm note 30, DR 
3-103(A), DR 5-107(C). 
70. See Model Rules, supm note 7, Rule 5.4(b), (d); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 
3-103(A), DR 5 -1070 .  
71. If institutions could develop, bringing many professions under one roof, they 
could draw on the talents of individuals of varied backgrounds and "have as their mission 
the broader goal of problem solving." James F. Fitzpatrick, Legal Future Shock The 
Role of Large Law Firms by the End of the Century, 64 Ind. L.J. 461,465 (1989). Despite 
the fact that multiprofessional offices have been discussed for several yam, the chilling 
effect of the ethical rules has prevented widespread experimentation with the concept. 
72. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 628. 
73. See id at 629. 
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splitting with a n ~ n l a w y e r . ~ ~  Thus, the internal pressure from profes- 
sional level administrative staff for more flexible compensation arrange- 
ments and greater control over decisionmaking evokes many of the same 
issues as the ancillary services pr~blem.~' 
A. Business or Profession 
Despite strong arguments that professionalism and business are not 
contradictory concepts, many practicing lawyers have become increas- 
ingly troubled by the changes they are witnessing and experiencing in the 
legal marketpla~e.~~ Their disaffection has not been limited to the spe- 
cific issue of lawyers in business with nonlawyers, although law practice 
diversification has been one of the many "evils" contributing to the per- 
ceived demise of professional standards. 
Recent debates on the question of ancillary business activities have fo- 
cused on whether law is a business or a profe~sion.'~ Adherents to the 
"law is a profession" position have lamented the demise of traditional 
standards of ethics, civility, and public service.78 They view creeping 
commercialism as the root of the problem.79 "Law as a business"-that 
is, a money-making trade-is seen as the antithesis of the public service 
ideal upon which the legal profession was founded.80 
The idea that professionalism is grounded in public service has its 
roots deep in the history of Anglo-American law. In the distant past 
when the French speaking Norman kings dispensed justice to an Anglo- 
74. See id. at 628. 
75. See id. at 629. 
76. See Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training 
and Certification of Advocates Essential to our System of Justice?, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 
227, 239 (1973) (if lawyers fail to maintain standards of professionalism themselves, they 
may lose traditional prerogatives such as self regulation); supra note 120 and accompany- 
ing text. 
77. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Law's Both a Business and a Profession, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 
24, 1988, at 13. 
78. See, cg.,  Peter Megargee Brown, The Quiet Revolution in the American Law Pro- 
fession: Remarks Before the Commission on Professionalism of the American Bar Associa- 
tion, 14 Fordham Urb. L.J. 855, 868 (1986): 
The atmosphere has become that of a Baghdad flea market: the blatant touting 
and puffing of wares; legal gossip publications stoking the flames of the business 
mentality within the profession while selling law office computer equipment and 
marketing client-building seminars. The current barbarians may well be the 
newly anointed "Manager-Accountants" who run the machine. They talk ear- 
nestly about the "real world"-their world. Their creed is the printout, the 
computer, and the bottom line. Their caterwaul is, "nothing is forever, not 
clients, not partners, not anything. . . ." All this despite centuries of history. 
79. See, cg.,  Stanley, supra note 22, at 22 ("[Llawyers and law firms seem to be drift- 
ing from an attitude of professionalism toward one of commercialism."). 
80. See Brown, supra note 78, at 867. Brown and Stanley both view the profession's 
trend toward a more businesslike orientation as a threat to such fundamental values as 
public service, loyalty to clients, and ultimately the bar's power of self regulation. 
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Saxon populace, it was necessary for parties to be represented by some- 
one who could speak the language of the court.81 These representatives 
were inevitably nobles who served out of fealty to their king. For such 
early advocates, service rather than profit was the reason to assume this 
role. English barristers today do not accept a fee, but rather receive an 
"honorarium" in acknowledgement of this tradition of public service.82 
While public service should be considered one of the main pillars of 
professionalism, it is not the only one. Education, status, and power are 
othersg3 And so is money.84 In the American legal profession today, 
there are very few individuals who come to the bar with sufficient per- 
sonal resources that they do not need to receive remuneration for their 
Furthermore, for at least the last century, legal education has 
been viewed as a pathway to upward mobility for generations of immi- 
grants' children.86 
It  is simply a myth to say that lawyers do not work for money, or that 
money making is not an inherent component of professionalism. The 
belief that practicing law can provide a lifestyle better than that of an 
assembly line worker or migrant farm laborer is fundamental to many 
practicing lawyers.87 
If part of being a professional involves making money, then the busi- 
ness aspects of practice are not inimical to professionalism; rather, they 
are inherent in it. This does not mean that making money should be- 
come the sole motivator for attorneys, or that unfettered greed should 
have any place in the concept of professionalism. In fact, the concept of 
professionalism implies a fair monetary return, as well as other privi- 
leges, in exchange for special responsibilities including public service. 
It is certainly appropriate to speak of a "duty of public service" for 
lawyers, based upon longstanding traditions in the legal profes~ion.~~ It 
is equally appropriate to discuss the professionalism of the business side 
of law, integrating the professional responsibilities of lawyers with the 
81. See 1 Frederick Pollock & Frederic W. Maitland, The History of English Law 85 
(2d ed. 1898). 
82. See Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics 169 (1953). 
83. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 5 1.5, at 14-15 (1986). 
84. See id at 15. 
85. In 1990, most law school graduates accepted positions with salaries ranging from 
$22,800 to $81,000. See National Ass'n for Law Placement, Class of 1990 Employment 
Report and Salary Survey 12 (1991). Although some individunl gnduntes mny p a s s  
substantial resources, and may not need to work for a living, it is improbable that this 
- 
number is large. 
86. See Robert Stevens, Law School: k g a l  Education in Amerim from the 1850s to 
the 1980s. at 74-75 (1983). ~ - - ~  ~ , -~ ~ .
87. ~ e > ~ o l f r a r n ,  supra note 83, 5 1.5, at 1415. 
88. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 6.1, urging lawyers to perform public interest 
legal service. The background to this section states: "Lawyers have traditionally as- 
sumed an individual obligation to provide legal services to those unable to afford thun." 
Id Rule 6.1 cmt. (citations omitted). Despite the admonition in the Rules and the ten- 
dency of many lawyers to engage in pro bono activities, m obligatory duty to provide 
public service has never existed in the legal profession. 
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right to compensation. To consider law to be either a business or a pro- 
fession, that is, as mutually exclusive alternatives, makes no sense histori- 
cally, theoretically or practically. It is time to put this red herring to 
rest. 
The proper inquiry ought to be: When lawyers earn money from the 
practice of law, what limitations does professionalism place on their 
money-making activities? Some of the restrictions are fairly obvious-a 
lawyer must charge a reasonable fee;89 a lawyer must segregate and ac- 
count for clients' funds separate from her own;g0 a lawyer should engage 
in pro bono public ser~ice;~'  a lawyer may not solicit business from stran- 
gers face-to-face in an intrusive way;92 a lawyer should withdraw from 
representing a client if his personal business interests interfere with his 
independent professional judgment.93 
The subject of ancillary businesses operated by law firms has generated 
a hue and cry among many practicing lawyers who are calling for a pro- 
hibition of these new forms of association with nonlawyers. In the name 
'of professionalism, the opponents of law firm diversification have de- 
nounced these innovative business arrangements as a threat to the tradi- 
tional values of the legal profes~ion.~~ This outcry is not likely to end 
soon. Contemporaneously, other lawyers have supported the develop- 
ment of such new forms of practice.95 This debate will continue to pit 
powerful segments within both the organized and practicing bar against 
each other.96 
Unfortunately, the rhetoric of advocacy has obscured the real issues 
highlighted by these new forms of practice. The opponents of diversifica- 
tion present a litany of horrors that might come to pass if law firms are 
allowed to go into business with nonla~yers.~' Their logic seems to be 
that if enough bad things could occur from business entanglements with 
89. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.5; Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2-106. 
90. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.5; Model Code, supra note 30, DR 9-102. 
91. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 6.1. There is no comparable section of the 
Model Code. 
92. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.3; Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2-104. 
93. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.7@); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 5- 
101(A). 
94. See L. Harold Levinson, Making Society's Legal System Accessible to Society: The 
Lawyer's Role and Its Implications, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 789, 791 (1988). The ABA has 
weathered such divisive issues as abortion and the Vietnam War, but these were external 
political questions. The ancillary business debate goes to the heart of lawyers' concept of 
themselves as professionals. The adversaries in this battle are unlikely to change their 
minds or their practices because of a vote of the ABA House of Delegates. 
95. See Jones, supra note 21, at 688-92. 
96. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 622. For example, James W. Jones, n leading 
advocate for more relaxed rules governing law firm affiliations, is a partner at Washing- 
ton's powerful Arnold & Porter, while Dennis Block, who has lead the opposition, is a 
partner in New York's Weil Gotshal & Manges. This dichotomy is typical of the division 
within the ABA on this issue. See Randall Samborn and Marianne Lavalle, ABA in 
Atlanta: Subsidiaries. Dan Quayle Dominate, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 26, 1991, at 3, 31. 
97. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
Heinonline - -  61 Fordham L. Rev. 576 1992-1993 
19921 LAW FIRM DIVERSIFICATION 577 
nonlawyers, then all such dealings are inappropriate. By banning such 
business arrangements, the multitude of horrors could not take place and 
professionalism could be maintained.98 
On the other side, proponents of diversification seem to gloss over the 
very real dangers that exist when law firms expand their services beyond 
traditional legal assistance to ~lients.9~ The reality is that potential 
problems involving lawyers' responsibilities to clients may present signifi- 
cant difficulties, but a prophylactic rule to solve the problem is overkill. 
Perhaps more importantly, the real issues in this dispute are, as Profes- 
sor Andrews has concluded, economic ones.loO Those law firms that 
have resisted expanding the scope of their services are in direct competi- 
tion with firms that have pursued more aggressive policies of attracting 
and servicing clients. 
B. The Evolving Marketplace 
To understand this competition among firms, it is necessary to ex- 
amine the evolution of large firm practice in the United States. Prior to 
1970, the legal marketplace was dominated by a handful of large firms in 
each major city, with the largest concentration in New York City.lol 
During the 1970s and 1980s, these firms expanded rapidly to keep pace 
with the growing appetite of large corporate clients for legal services.lm 
Between 1982 and 1987, fees for legal services increased from 
$34,325,371,000 to $66,997,543,000 (an increase of 95.2%).lo3 Firms 
grew to meet the needs of their clients, and an increasing number of me- 
dium-sized firms grew into large firms operating competitively in the 
same market. During the 1980s, as businesses expanded, practice areas 
such as corporate mergers and acquisitions, and commercial real estate 
boomed. lo4 
98. See Levinson, supra note 94, at 805, 807. 
99. "The primary objective of any lawyer should k to deliver qunlity work and ser- 
vice. The ownership of the organization where that lawyer works has nothing to do with 
quality or service." Thomas S. Clay, Yes' Excellence Must Be Rewarded, 76 A.B.A. J., 
May 1990, at 38, 38. 
100. Professor Andrews recounts the history of the "business canons," the term that 
he uses to describe the ethical rules governing business associations with nonkwyers. See 
Andrews, supra note 13, at 579-600. He concludes that an important basis for these rules 
is economic protectionism. See i d  at 622. Nevertheless, he argues that the rules are not 
subject to either constitutional or antitrust attack See id  at 617-21. According to An- 
drews, the best prospects for changing the rules come from the Stilts themselves, Con- 
gress, or the Federal Trade Commission. See i d  at 656. The question of a legal challenge 
to these rules is addressed further in Part I11 of this Article. 
101. See Daniel J. Cantor, Law Firms Are Getting Bigger. . . and More Complex, 64 
A.B.A. J. 215,215 (1978). 
102. See Steven Brill, A Boom in Premium Deal Work, Am. Law., Ju1.-Aug. 1989 
(Supplement), at 6; Jones, supra note 21, at 687. 
103. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Pub. No. SC87-A-52, 1987 
Census of Service Industries, table 3a at US-20 (1990). 
104. See Emily Couric, Specialties' What's Hot, IVhot's Not, Nat'l W., Feb. 3, 1986, 
at 1, 26-28 (hot areas identified in early 1986 include general corponte/securities, bank- 
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The Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona '05 
translated into more than a go-ahead for legal advertising. It meant that 
firms could actively market their services to prospective clients. lo6 Long- 
standing professional relationships were no longer sacred. Clients had 
more firms from which to choose, and, thus, attorneys who actively 
sought clients, and who offered an array of services to attract them, had 
a distinct advantage in the marketplace. Conversely, firms that could not 
compete in this new, diversified environment fell upon hard times, and 
lawyers who were not "rainmakers" lost influence in their 
organizations. lo' 
One approach to change that many firms found attractive was expan- 
sion into new geographical markets. One of the first mergers on a na- 
tional level was between Kutak, Rock of Omaha, and Huie, Brown & Ide 
of Atlanta.lo8 These two firms recognized the value of a national prac- 
tice. In the ensuing years, many firms opted to establish branch offices in 
Washington, D.C., various state capitals, and cities where their clients 
had offices.10g This geographical expansion placed new pressures on lo- 
cal firms, since clients of the out-of-town firm could utilize a branch of- 
fice of their retained firm as opposed to traditional local counsel.110 It is 
likely that the expansion of out-of-state firms into the Washington, D.C., 
market had a direct bearing on the decision of many D.C. firms to enter 
into ancillary business ventures. In addition to producing additional in- 
come for the law firms, the operation of nonlaw businesses enabled the 
firms to offer a wider range of services than their  competitor^.^" 
ing and real estate); Craig Endicott, 100 Markets Diversity for Growth, Advertising Age, 
Dec. 8, 1986 at S-2, S-3 ("The biggest growth area in Atlanta is commercial real estate [in 
19861."); Ellen L. Rosen, The Large-Finn Boom Continues: A 10-year Look, Nat'l L.J., 
Sept. 28, 1987, at S-2, S-26, ("Skadden's expertise in mergers and acquisitions was the 
'engine driving the firm' to quadruple in size."). 
105. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
106. See Birth of a Salesman, supra note 23, at 12-13. 
107. As competition increases and other firms develop new areas of specialization, in- 
ternal tensions increase, more lawyers have less to do, and non-performers and former 
rainmakers get defensive. See Chris Bridge, Proposal from Chris Bridge: Firm Leadership 
Must Be Confident and Committed, Am. Law., Dec. 1990, (Pullout Management Re- 
port), at 25. When law firms merge, only those considered rainmakers-"those with a 
well-established client list and ability to bring in new business"-are absorbed by the new 
firm. Joan Vennochi, Two Boston Law Firms Talking of a Merger, The Boston Globe, 
Aug. 23, 1990, at 57. 
108. See Mitchell Pacelle, Kutak after Kutak, Am. Law., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 33, 103. 
109. See Angel Castillo, New York Lawyers Branching Out To Florida, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 23, 1980, 9 1, at 1; Andrew W. Lehren, Outside Firms Making Mark in Philadel- 
phia, Phila. Bus. J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3B; see also Paul F. Bellows, Branches: Key to 
Growth, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 26, 1988, at S-13 (discussing growth of branch offices). 
110. Law firms are becoming nationwide to better serve their clients in other parts of 
the country. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 71, at 463. 
11 1. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. This was particularly significant in the 
legal market of Washington, D.C., where clients frequently required services that tmn- 
scended the bounds of traditional law practice. It also remained true in rural areas, and 
became relevant in a widening circle of jurisdictions. Had ancillary business simply been 
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As the 1980s drew to a close, the frenzy of legal activity that charac- 
terized the decade diminished. Changes in the stock market, investment 
banking, and corporate takeovers chilled the corporate legal market.'12 
This slowdown produced a ripple effect in many other areas of practice. 
As a result, competition among law firms intensified even more. Head- 
lines in the legal press told the story of numerous old-line, silk-stocking 
firms closing, splitting up, or merging into other entities."' It would be 
unusual today for any large firm to escape a close introspective examina- 
tion of its institutional identity, client base, and future. 
Not surprisingly, in an effort to compete in this new environment, 
some firms chose a more conservative direction than others, and resisted 
expansion into nonlaw businesses. These firms have become staunch op- 
ponents of diversification, and vice versa."4 If the debate were simply 
which approach is most economically efficient, we could leave it to free 
market forces. The debate, however, now implicates the propriety of 
lawyers' conduct and calls into question the fundamental requirements of 
professionalism. Hence, it becomes necessary to explore the two 
positions. 
C. The Law Firm Divers~jication Battle 
The advent of the diversification movement was heralded as early as 
1980, with a report of the American Bar Association Commission on 
Professional Standards, also known as the Kutak Commission.11s The 
discussion draft of the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
recommended the adoption of Rule 7.5.lI6 The Kutak Commission's 
a D.C. concern, it is unlikely the issue would have engendered the national acrimony that 
it has. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27. 
112. See Michael Bradley, The Party's Over, Phila Bus. J., Jan. 7, 1991, § 1, at 1 
("Those in the mergers and acquisitions business are working harder on fewer transac- 
tions."); Jones, supra note 21, at 684-86; Michael Quint, The Dicey Future at Chase Man- 
hattan, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1990, § 3, at 1.6 ("More recently, the big banks hnve been set 
back by the drop in the commercial real estate market and a sharp slowdown in the very 
profitable, albeit risky, business of financing mergers and acquisitions."). 
113. See Stephen Labaton, Old-Line Law Finn Agrees to Biggest New York Merger, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1988, at Al; Dana Leonard, Howdy, Partner: Alizona Law Finns 
Join National Trend, Catch Care of Mergermania, Ariz. Bus. Gazette, Jan. 2, 1989.5 2, at 
1; David Margolick, Prestigious Law Finn on Wall Street to Split, N.Y. Times. Mar. 6. 
1982, 9 2, at 27. 
114. It may sound cynical to assert that the philosophical positions of the adherents 
followed the economic ones, but a review of the support for the opposing positions in the 
ancillary business debate suggests that this is the case. It would be naive to suggest that 
Dennis Block and Justin Stanley, leading opponents of diversification, arc not as aconom- 
ically vested in the outcome of the issue as James Jones, the leading proponent. Their 
Ems have cast their lot with a narrow definition of law practice that precludes diversifi- 
cation into nonlegal areas. If they lose the political battle, the economic war may be 
decided as well. 
115. The "Kutak Commission" was the nickname for the ABA Comm'n on Evalua- 
tion of Professional Standards, named for its chairman, Robert J. Kutnk. See Andretvs, 
supra note 13, at 593. 
116. The proposed rule permitted nonlawyers to maintain on interest in a law firm 
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proposal represented a much more liberal view of business affiliations be- 
tween lawyers and nonlawyers than was contemplated under the existing 
Code of Professional Responsibility.'" In the initial skirmish, support- 
ers of the traditional rules prohibiting lawyers from becoming entangled 
with nonlegal entities successfully prevented the adoption of proposed 
Rule 7.5.'18 The ABA Model Rules as finally adopted continued the 
Code's blanket prohibitions against business arrangements with 
nonlawyers. 
The first real salvo of the present battle was sounded in 1986 by an- 
other ABA commission, the Commission on Professionalism (or the 
Stanley Commission, as it was called, in recognition of its chair, former 
ABA President Justin Stanley).'lg The report of the Stanley Commission 
addressed a number of issues suggesting that there had been a decline in 
professionalism among lawyers. On the issue of ancillary businesses, the 
Commission wrote: 
The Commission has been disturbed by what it perceives to be an 
increasing participation by lawyers in business activities. The activities 
take several forms. . . . 
It  seems clear to the Commission that the greater the participation 
by lawyers in activities other than the practice of law, the less likely it 
is that the lawyer can capably discharge the obligations which our pro- 
fession demands. The Commission views the trend as disturbing and 
urges the American Bar Association to initiate a study to see what, if 
any, controls or prohibitions should be imposed.'20 
provided that the firm upheld specific ethical requirements. The proposed rule read as 
follows: 
A lawyer shall not practice with a firm in which an interest is owned or mana- 
gerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, unless services can be rendered in 
conformity with the Rules of Professional Conduct. The terms of the relation- 
ship shall expressly provide that: 
(a) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judg- 
ment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and 
@) the confidences of clients are protected as required by Rule 1.7; and 
(c) the arrangement does not involve advertising or solicitation prohibited by 
Rules 9.2 and 9.3 [presently Rules 7.2 and 7.3 respectively]; and 
(d) the arrangement does not result in charging a client a fee which violates 
Rule 1.6 [presently Rule 1-51. 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.5 (Discussion Draft 1980). This formula is 
very similar to the one rejected in North Dakota. See supra note 40. 
117. The "Kutak Commission" spent five years reformulating the prior Model Code. 
Its proposed Rule 7.5 held a very different view on associations between lawyers and 
nonlawyers than the Code. 
118. This proposed rule was successfully opposed based on several objections: the pro- 
posal would permit Sears, Montgomery Ward, H&R Block, or the big eight accounting 
firms to open offices in competition with traditional law firms; nonlawyer ownership 
would interfere with a lawyer's professional independence; nonlawyer ownership would 
destroy a lawyer's ability to be a professional; and it would have a fundamental but un- 
known effect on the legal profession. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 595. 
119. See American Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Professionalism, ". . . . In the Spirit of Pub- 
lic Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986). 
120. Id. at 30-3 1. 
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Since a number of major law firms were already experimenting with 
ancillary businesses, being told that they were not professional did not sit 
well at all. In fact, the District of Columbia Bar Association disregarded 
the Stanley Commission's report and adopted amendments to its Rules of 
Professional Conduct that allowed nonlawyers to become partners with 
lawyers in law firms.121 
Meanwhile, the Stanley Commission Report led to the creation of a 
Special Coordinating Committee on Professionalism whose mission was 
to consider, among other things, business attiliations between lawyers 
and nonlawyers. The Professionalism Committee conducted hearings, 
published a newsletter,lu and discussed the issue. The general consensus 
of this bipartisan group was that law firm diversification should be regu- 
lated but not prohibited 0 ~ t r i g h t . l ~ ~  A minority report by Dennis Block 
of the Litigation Section took the opposite position that ancillary busi- 
ness should be prohibited as contrary to the tenets of professiona1i~m.l~~ 
The minority view was presented to the ABA House of Delegates in a 
separate report from the Litigation Section Committee on Ancillary 
Busine~s. '~~ 
The House of Delegates declined to adopt the Litigation Section's rec- 
ommendat ion~.~~~ Instead, in August 1990, it referred the question to 
the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility.12' 
The Ethics Committee, after holding hearings and receiving written com- 
ments, issued a draft proposal for a new Model Rule 5.7 that recognized 
ancillary business activities, and attempted to clarify the ethical obliga- 
tions of lawyers who engage in such ventures.12' Failing to address the 
issues of fee splitting or nonlawyer partnerships, the proposal simply pro- 
121. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
122. See, eg., The Professional Lawyer (Special Coordinating Committee on Profes- 
sionalism, American Bar Ass'n Center for Professional Responsibility) Summer 1989 
(newsletter). 
123. See Working Group On Ancillary Business Activities Interim Report to the ABA 
Special Coordinating Committee On Professionalism 1 (1990). 
124. See American Bar Association Litigation Section Recommendation And Report 
To The House Of Delegates On Ancillary Business Activities Of Lawyers 1, appendix 
(1989) (minority report by Dennis J. Block). 
125. See id This effort was also lead by Dennis Block, who perhaps concluded that it 
would be a better strategy to take the offensive through a section resolution, nther than 
wait for his adversaries to act. 
126. See Summary Of Action Taken By The House Of Delegates Of The American 
Bar Association: 1990 Midyear Meeting 7-8 (1990). 
127. See American Bar Association Standing Committee On Ethics And Professional 
Responsibility: Special Coordinating Committee On Professionalism Report To The 
House of Delegates 11 (1990). 
128. The final text of the proposal after much tinkering was as follows: 
(a) A lawyer who provides, or whose law firm provides, representation to cli- 
ents, and who is also associated, or whose law firm is also associated, with an 
ancillary business entity: 
(1) shall initially disclose in writing to all customers of the ancillary business 
entity the nature of the relationship between the lawyer or law firm and the 
ancillary business entity; and 
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vided that lawyers could operate ancillary businesses (which most ob- 
servers conceded could be done already), but fell short of permitting 
nonlawyer investment in legal services. Under the proposal, a firm could 
operate an ancillary consulting firm or hire consultants to serve as sala- 
ried employees of the firm, but it could not name the consultants as part- 
ners in the firm or share fees with them other than indirectly through a 
qualified compensation plan.129 The proposal thus accomplished an 
anomalous result. While the economic interests of lawyers were pro- 
tected, no protection was afforded to the economic interests of nonlawyer 
consultants, who were prevented from maximizing the value of their 
(2) shall treat a customer of the ancillary business entity in all respects as a 
client under the Rules of Professional Conduct, unless: 
(i) the ancillary service is unrelated to any matter in which representation is 
provided by the lawyer or the law firm to the customer as a client of the 
lawyer or law firm; and 
(ii) the lawyer or law firm directly or through the ancillary business entity, 
has first clearly communicated to that customer by means including written 
disclosure, that the relationship between the ancillary business entity nnd the 
customer is that of non-legal business and customer, not that of lawyer and 
client. 
(b) In the circumstances in which a customer of an ancillary business entity is 
required to be treated as a client pursuant to paragraph (a) (2): 
(1) a lawyer who is a partner in the law firm associated with the ancillary busi- 
ness entity shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the entity has in effect 
measures giving reasonable assurance that the conduct with respect to that cus- 
tomer of all those employed or retained by or associated with the entity con- 
forms to the Rules of Professional Conduct; 
(2) a practicing lawyer associated with the ancillary business entity who has 
direct supervisory authority over persons employed or retained by or associated 
with the entity shall make reasonable efforts to assure that their conduct with 
respect to that customer is compatible with the professional obligations of the 
lawyer; 
(3) a practicing lawyer associated with the ancillary business entity shall be 
responsible for conduct with respect to that customer of a person employed or 
retained by or associated with the entity that would be a violation of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer and if: 
(i) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the relevant facts and the specific 
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or 
(ii) the lawyer is a partner in a law firm associated with that entity or has 
direct supervisory authority over the person and knows of the conduct at a 
time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take re- 
medial action; and 
(4) if the lawver reasonablv should know that the ancillarv business entity is 
not complying with any obiigation imposed by the Rules of Professional cbn- 
duct with respect to the provision of ancillary services to such customers, the 
lawyer shall dissociate frdm the entity unless <he entity immediately rectifies the 
situation. 
American Bar Association Standing Committee On Ethics And Professional Responsibil- 
ity: Recommendation And Report To The House Of Delegates 3-4 (1991) (Proposed 
Model Rule 5.7). 
129. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. The limits of this provision in regard 
to the inclusion of nonlawyers in pension or compensation plans has not been fully ex- 
plored. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a)(3); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3- 
102(A)(3). A firm arguably could avoid the restriction on fee splitting imposed by Rule 
5.4, by making profit based payments through the compensation or retirement plan. 
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services in the marketplace if they wished to engage in joint ventures 
with lawyers. 
The Ethics Committee Report argued that three basic ethical issues 
are involved: confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and interference with 
the lawyer's independent professional judgment.130 The Committee did 
not suggest that one of the problems was improper solicitation. To have 
done so might have subjected the proposal to the criticism that it was 
merely concerned with economics. Alternatively, the Committee may 
have concluded that Rules 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 were sufficient to protect 
against improper solicitation through a nonlawyer affiliate.131 The Com- 
mittee failed to explain why other ethical rules were insufficient to cover 
the remaining ethical issues. 
Not surprisingly, this report did not satisfy either side in the debate.13* 
Some of those who supported the ancillary business concept may have 
felt that the proposal created an abstruse web of restrictions that simply 
rephrased the existing rules without broadening the range of permissible 
ancillary business activities, thereby obfuscating the issue. Opponents 
may have objected to the proposal's tacit acceptance of the concept of 
ancillary businesses and its failure to address problems involving con- 
flicts, confidentiality and confusion. 
The Litigation Section offered an alternative proposal prohibiting law 
firms from offering ancillary services, in whatever form, to anyone not 
already a client of the firm.133 That rule would effectively close the door 
to most external ancillary businesses, and severely restrict in-house pro- 
vision of ancillary services. 
Both sides characterized their dispute as a choice between regulation 
and ~rohibiti0n.l~~ In one of the closest and most controversial votes in 
the ABA in recent years, the House of Delegates, after rejecting the Eth- 
ics Committee proposal, adopted the Litigation Section rule by a vote of 
197 to 186.13' After the vote, the winners hailed the victory as a sign%- 
cant one, while advocates of diversification minimized the potential im- 
130. See American Bar Association Standing Committee On Ethics And Professional 
Responsibility: Report To The House of Delegates 14 (1991) (summaribng the Ethics 
Committee's study of lawyers' ancillary business activities). 
131. See id 
132. See id (Minority Report Of Ralph G. Elliot, Minority Report Of William C. 
McClearn). 
133. See American Bar Association Litigation Section Recommendation And Report 
To The House Of Delegates 1-2 (1991). Most significantly, the 1991 version differed from 
the earlier Litigation Section proposal by dropping the socalled solo-practitioner cxcep 
tion which had allowed individual practitioners to operate ancillary businesses. See 
American Bar Association Litigation Section Recommendation And Report To The 
House Of Delegates 2 (1990). The exception had been criticized as an inconsistency that 
illustrated the inappropriateness of a prophylactic rule. See supm note 44 and accompa- 
nying text. 
134. See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, ABA Rejects Ancillary Business, Inruads on Client 
Confidences, 60 U.S.L.W. 2121, 2122 (Aug. 20, 1991). 
135. See id 
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pact of the decision.13'j 
In August 1992, the ABA House of Delegates, by a seven vote margin, 
repealed Model Rule 5.713' before any jurisdiction had adopted it. It 
remains to be seen what effect this vacillation will have. Some states may 
yet adopt some variation of Rule 5.7 while others may fashion more lib- 
eral rules along the lines of Washington D.C. Still others may retain the 
status quo. Such a scenario would only further confuse the issue because 
the standards adopted by the states would not be uniform.'38 
In an era of increasing multijurisdictional practice, a proliferation of 
standards would produce serious problems. A law firm with offices in 
several different states might face conflicting ethical obligations imposed 
by different  jurisdiction^.'^^ Clients may be confused as to how they 
should obtain ancillary services. If this long battle over diversification 
continues, as it probably will, the ABA's legitimacy as a voice for the 
legal profession on ethical issues may be seriously eroded.'& 
Beyond the question of whether the rules should be changed is the 
more fundamental issue of whether they must be changed. An examina- 
tion of case law involving the bar's regulatory powers demonstrates that 
these rules cannot pass judicial muster. To understand this failure, it is 
necessary to consider the interrelationship of a number of court decisions 
involving lawyers in the areas of federal antitrust law and the First 
Amendment. 
136. These lawyers seem just as committed to continuing the fight as their opponents. 
The losers in the August shootout, lead by the Real Property Section, introduced a reso- 
lution to rescind the House action on ancillary business activities at the Association's 
1992 midyear meeting in Dallas. In Dallas, the resolution was withdrawn with a promise 
that it would be presented at the next annual meeting in San Francisco, in August, 1992. 
137. See Randall Samborn & Victoria Slind-Nor, ABA '92: Feminism is Theme, Nat'l 
L.J., Aug. 24, 1992, at 1, 34. 
138. In 1990, the ABA General Practice Section pushed through a rule that permits 
the sale of a law practice. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.17. Because this rule 
has not been added to state Rules of Professional Conduct, it has no authority and little 
persuasive power. If anything, it adds confusion in regard to the application of the Model 
Rules to actual practice. 
139. In the case of the District of Columbia, passage of D.C. Rule 5.4(b), which per- 
mits nonlawyer partners, raises interesting conflict of laws questions. Will a lawyer, who 
is licensed in a state that does not allow nonlawyer partners, and practices as a partner in 
a District of Columbia firm with a nonlawyer partner, be disciplined for violating state 
Rule 5.4? Such a possibility is very real. 
140. Although most jurisdictions have adopted the Model Rules, often subject to their 
own variations, no mechanism exists for grafting amendments to the Model Rules on to 
the state Rules. Thus, model rules such as Rule 1.17 may remain mere models unless 
they are adopted by the individual states. This departure from a uniform standard under- 
mines the overall persuasiveness of the Model Rules and erodes the development of a 
national standard for ethical practice. 
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A. Antitrust Considerations 
The question of whether the rules restricting associations with 
nonlawyers violate federal antitrust laws is not a simple one. The Sher- 
man Anti-Trust Act prohibits business combinations that restrict free 
trade, fix prices, or conspire to limit control of a business or industry to 
certain members of ~ociety.'~' The Act was originally intended to break 
up monopolistic business organizations that had evolved during the latter 
half of the nineteenth century.142 Over the years, the Act has been uti- 
lized as a weapon to prevent big business from squeezing out smaller 
competit~rs. '~~ Activities by any organization, group of organizations, 
or individuals that promote monopolistic practices are subject to regula- 
tion under the 
Conversely, the state has the power to restrict trade, grant monopolies 
and authorize business combinations that would otherwise be illegal. In 
Parker v. Brown,'45 the Supreme Court recognized a state action exemp- 
tion to the coverage of the Sherman Act.la In Parker, farmers chal- 
lenged a state regulatory program governing the production and 
marketing of farm crops.I4' The Court held that the Sherman Act was 
not intended to restrict state action in areas of legitimate state interest.148 
It should be noted that the Court has not refused the states the right to 
grant certain monopolies, including the exclusive right to practice law,149 
teach,lS0 or grant degrees.15' While there may be limits on a state's regu- 
latory power, it is essential for an ordered society that the state have 
power to make such regulatory decisions.152 
This principle was tested in a case involving the legal profession, Gold- 
141. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. $$ 1-7 (1988). 
142. See Thomas V. Vakerics, Antitrust Basics 8 1.01 (Rel. 8 1992) ("The bs ic  prem- 
ise of the Sherman Act is that unrestrained competition will result in the most favorable 
allocation of economic resources and the lowest prices possible for a variety of goods nnd 
services."); see ako United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,428 (2d 
Cir. 1945) ("[Almong the purposes of Congress in 1890 wns a desire to put nn end to 
great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual Wore them."). 
143. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); United States v. 
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (191 1). 
144. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,809 (1946); Aluminum 
GJ., 148 F.2d at 428-29. 
145. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
146. See i d  at 361. 
147. See i d  at 348-49. 
148. See id  at 350-51. 
149. See In  re Pitchford, 581 S.W.2d 321,323 (Ark.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979); 
Brown v. Wood, 516 S.W.2d 98, 99-100 (Ark 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). 
150. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Ex re.! Charles, 503 N.E2d 
592, 600 (Mass. 1987); Minnesota v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 527-28 (Minn. 1985) 
(citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)). 
151. See Nova University v. Board of Governors, 287 S.EM 872, 882 W.C. 1982). 
152. The question of when the government should regulate or deregulate nn industry, 
although interesting and timely, is beyond the scope of this Article. It will be assumed 
for purposes of this discussion that some intrusion into the nffnirs of the legal profession 
implicates legitimate state interests. 
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farb v. Virginia State Bar,lS3 where two home buyers, who were them- 
selves lawyers, sought to overturn the state bar's minimum fee schedule 
after they discovered that every lawyer they contacted about settlement 
on their new home quoted an identical price.lS4 At the time, most state 
bars, including Virginia's, published minimum fee schedules.155 Any 
deviation from this schedule could subject a lawyer to discipline. The 
rationale underlying these minimum fee schedules was the protection of 
the public. It was argued that by maintaining price stability and prevent- 
ing cut-rate practices, the bar could better provide professional services 
to clients.156 In 1975, when Goldfarb was decided, there was a blanket 
prohibition against advertising by lawyers as we11.lS7 As a result, the 
minimum fee schedule was frequently the only information available to 
clients about the cost of legal services.158 
In deciding Goldfarb, the Court recognized the hybrid nature of a bar 
association. On the one hand, the bar can stand in the shoes of the sover- 
eign, participating in such activities as licensure, discipline, and regula- 
tion of lawyer conduct under grant of authority from the legislature and/ 
or the courts.15g On the other hand, the bar can act like a trade associa- 
tion, promoting the parochial interests of its members, lobbying for 
favorable legislation, providing social activities, and affording individual 
lawyers a representative organization through which they could voice 
their opinions as a group.16' 
Goldfarb suggests that whenever the bar exceeds the scope of its sover- 
eign capacity, it is merely a trade association, and as such, is not exempt 
from the application of the Sherman Act.161 It cannot hide behind the 
153. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
154. See id. at 775-78. 
155. Before Goldfarb, over one-half of the state bar associations had promulgated min- 
imum fee schedules. See John S. Dzienkowski, The Regulation of the American Legal 
Profession and Its Reform, 68 Tex L. Rev. 451, 467 n.123 (1989) (reviewing Richard L. 
Abel, American Lawyers (1989)). 
156. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 781. Under the prevailing paternalistic view of lawyer- 
ing, clients were presumed to be so unsophisticated that they could not appreciate the 
value of legal services, and in the absence of fee schedules could be victimized by unscru- 
pulous lawyers. 
157. See Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2-101. 
158. The author recalls taking a course in Professional Responsibility as a student in 
1972, during which the professor brought to class a box of minimum fee schedules and 
told his students that they should charge exactly what the schedules said in order to stay 
out of trouble with the grievance committee. This instruction rendered the topic of legal 
fees rather easy to master. 
159. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791. The Virginia State Bar in Goldfarb was a volun- 
tary association. Even though its minimum fee schedule could be used as a basis for 
disciplining lawyers under the state's Code of Professional Responsibility, the promulga- 
tion of the fee schedule did not constitute state action under the Parker doctrine. See id. 
at 788-92. Apparently the critical distinction is between sovereign acts and non-sovereign 
policies aimed at influencing lawyers' conduct, rather than the distinction between a vol- 
untary or integrated bar. 
160. See id. at 791-92. 
16 1. See id. 
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protection of the state action exemption to the Sherman Act merely be- 
cause of its status as a bar association, nor can it transform an action of 
the association into state action merely by labeling it as 
Two years after Goldfarb, the Court addressed the question of adver- 
tising by lawyers in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.163 It was argued in 
Bates that the same reasoning governing the Goldfarb decision should 
apply to the ban on advertising, i.e., that the bar association was simply 
acting as a trade association, and the ban on advertising constituted an 
illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.164 The Court, however, 
concluded that the power to regulate advertising was state action pro- 
tected under Parker v. Brown.165 Because the Code of Professional Re- 
sponsibility was promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court and not the 
bar association, as had been the case in Goldfarb, the ban on advertising 
constituted an exercise of the state's sovereign power, and therefore was 
excluded from the scope of the Sherman Act by the Parker doctrine.lM 
Limitations on the extent of the state's power to regulate advertising de- 
rived instead from commercial speech principles under the First 
Amendment.16' 
Since the Bates decision, commentators have uncritically accepted the 
notion that any challenge to a state's ethical rules based on the Sherman 
Act must fail.16* It may be time to review this assumption again. 
Bates and Goldfarb present two different results distinguishable by the 
fact that in Bates the challenged regulation was promulgated by the Ari- 
zona Supreme Court, while in Goldfarb the minimum fee schedule was 
established by a bar association. Under the Bates reasoning, it would 
seem to follow that a minimum fee schedule adopted by the Supreme 
Court would be exempt from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown. 
Conversely, an ethical rule that is unilaterally adopted by a state bar as- 
sociation which prohibits the advertising of legal services could be chal- 
lenged on the grounds that it is anticompetitive. 
The latter position is exactly the one in which doctors, dentists, and 
162. See id 
163. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
164. See id at 359. 
165. See id 
166. See id at 360. Although the Court in Goldfarb declined to rely on the constitu- 
tional protection of the First Amendment as the basis for its decision, it accomplished the 
same result under the Sherman Act. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 
788-92 (1975). In Goldfarb, the bar association's minimum fee schedule was thrown out 
in part because it deprived the Goldfarbs of their opportunity to select an attorney of 
their choice. See id at 785. This is arguably a question of freedom of association impli- 
cating First Amendment rights. Thus, both Goldfarb and Bares contnin antitrust and 
constitutional elements, although the Court decides the two crises under diaerent 
theories. 
167. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 365; infm part III.B.2. 
168. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 656. The Federal Trade Commission may have 
reached the same conclusion when it decided not to proceed against lawyers s it has 
against other professionals. 
Heinonline - -  61 Fordham L. Rev. 587 1992-1993 
588 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW pol .  61 
other professionals find themselves. In a series of cases, the courts have 
struck down regulations relative to fees and external relationships. The 
Federal Trade Commission has prosecuted these cases aggressively on 
the ground that the practices are anticompetitive, and therefore violate 
the Sherman Act. At the same time, the F.T.C. has declined to pursue 
similar actions against lawyers primarily because of the limitations im- 
posed by Parker v. Brown. 
In American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Cornmis~ion,'~~ the Sec- 
ond Circuit upheld a Federal Trade Commission order requiring the 
A.M.A. to cease and desist from promulgating, implementing and en- 
forcing restrictions on advertising and the solicitation of services by phy- 
sicians. This determination also extended to contractual arrangements 
between physicians and nonphysi~ians.'~~ The A.M.A. case represented 
the culmination of a protracted effort by the F.T.C. to change A.M.A. 
policy. 
While American Medical Ass'n v. l? T. C dealt with the question of 
whether the A.M.A. had acted in concert to effectuate restraints on 
trade, Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n 17' concerned actual victims of 
anticompetitive policies. Wilk involved a suit brought by chiropractors 
against the American Medical Association charging that the "defendants 
engaged in a conspiracy to eliminate the chiropractic profession by refus- 
ing to deal with the plaintiffs and other  chiropractor^."'^^ Principle 3 of 
the A.M.A.3 Principles of Medical Ethics provided that "[a] physician 
should practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis; and he 
should not voluntarily professionally associate with anyone who violates 
this prin~iple."'~~ The plaintiffs contended that "the AMA used Princi- 
ple 3 to achieve a boycott of chiropractors by first calling chiropractors 
'unscientific practitioners,' and then advising AMA members and other 
medical societies that it was unethical . . . to associate with chiroprac- 
t o r ~ . " ' ~ ~  In rejecting the A.M.A. position, the court held "that the 
AMA and its members engaged in a group boycott or conspiracy against 
 chiropractor^'"^^ in violation of the Sherman Act. 
169. 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980). This case may be contrasted with United States v. 
Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 339 (1952) (government failed to prove that 
the defendant physicians concertedly refused to deal with the private health associations). 
170. See American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d 443, 447 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
171. 671 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff'd, 895 F.2d 358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
496 U.S. 927 (1990). This case was on remand from the Seventh Circuit's decision in 
Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), which had reversed the 
trial court's original decision in favor of the A.M.A. 
172. Wilk, 671 F. Supp. at 1470. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 1477. The A.M.A. argued that the considerable body of evidence intro- 
duced by the plaintiffs was insufficient to establish that the group boycott was an unrea- 
sonable restraint of trade, because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an impact on price 
and output. See id. at 1479 (citing F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 
(1986); Philip Areeda, The Rule ofReason-A Catechism or1 Competition, 55 Antitrust 
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The court in Wilk used a rule of reason analysis in finding that the 
actions of the A.M.A. were un1awf~l . l~~  Under the rule of reason, the 
court considers the effect upon competition produced by the restraint of 
trade. Where the restraint is unreasonable in light of the effects pro- 
duced, the restraint will be invalidate-d.'" An analysis of the market 
power of the group engaged in the restraint is frequently utilized by the 
court in determining the reasonableness of the restraint."8 Thus, in 
Wilk, the court rejected the A.M.A.3 contention that evidence indicating 
adverse effects, rather than a specific impact on price and output, was 
insufficient to establish market power. 
The treatment of group boycotts involving professional associations 
was addressed in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of 
Dentists,'79 cited in Wilk. In Indiana Federation of Dentists, dentists and 
dental societies, objecting to health insurers' requests for x-rays for re- 
view purposes, collectively agreed to withhold the x-rays from the insur- 
ers. Justice White, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, stated: 
A refusal to compete with respect to the package of services offered to 
customers, no less than a refusal to compete with respect to the price 
term of an agreement, impairs the ability of the market to advance 
social welfare by ensuring the provision of desired goods and services 
. . . . Absent some countervailing procompetitive virtue . . . such an 
agreement limiting consumer choice . . . cannot be sustained under the 
Rule of ~ e a s 0 n . l ~ ~  
The court explained its application of the rule of reason rather than a 
per se analysis: 
Although this Court has in the past stated that group boycotts are 
un la f ipe r  se, we decline to resolve this case by forcing the Federa- 
tion's policy into the "boycott" pigeonhole and invoking the per se 
rule. . . . m h e  category of restraints classed as group boycotts is not 
to be expanded indiscriminately, and theper se approach has generally 
been limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott suppli- 
ers or customers in order to discourage them from doing business with 
a competitor-a situation obviously not present here. Moreover, we 
have been slow to condemn rules adopted by professional associations 
as unreasonable per se, see National Society of Profesrional Engineers v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), and, in general, to extend per se 
analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships 
where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately ob- 
L.J. 571 (1986)). A group boycott is an action by members of one group to refrain from 
using the products or services of another group. Here, the court found that "[ilf thue is 
actual proof of adverse effects, then the plaintiffs need not prove market definition and 
market power." Id at 1479. 
176. See id at 1477. The other approach is a per se annlysis. described infm. at note 
18 1 and accompanying text. 
177. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 5 68 (1977). 
178. See id 5 69. 
179. 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
180. Id at 459. 
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vious. Thus, as did the FTC, we evaluate the restraint at issue in this 
case under the Rule of Reason rather than a rule ofper se illegality.'81 
Thus, it appears that the rule of reason approach will generally be fol- 
lowed where a professional association engages in a group boycott.I8' 
One recent case, Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Law- 
yers A ~ s ' n , ' ~ ~  however, provides an exception to this trend. In a decision 
that has been criticized,lS4 the Supreme Court applied a per se analysis to 
find that the association's group boycott constituted an undue restraint of 
trade.'85 Likewise, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medi~alSociety,~~~ the 
Supreme Court held that the maximum-fee price fixing agreements of a 
county medical society constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 
While price fixing and other manifestly anticompetitive conduct may 
trigger a per se analysis, Kreuzer v. American Academy of Peri- 
odont~loay '~~ illustrates the more typical judicial response to a group 
boycott by a professional association. In Kreuzer, the defendant associa- 
tion promulgated "limited practice requirements" that required members 
to restrict their practice to period on tic^.'^^ Because he refused to follow 
these requirements, Dr. Kreuzer was excluded from membership in the 
A.A.P. and denied access to patients.Ig9 The District of Columbia Cir- 
cuit refbsed to apply a per se rule, and instead relied on the rule of ren- 
son. The court noted that: 
Group boycotts serve a variety of objectives. The classic group boycott 
is a concerted attempt by a group of competitors at one level of compe- 
tition to insulate themselves from competition from nongroup mem- 
bers who seek to compete at that same level. Typically, the boycotting 
group combines to deprive would-be competitors of a trade relation- 
ship which they need in order to enter the level of competition at 
which the group operates.lgO 
Recognizing that noneconomic motives, such as patient care, may con- 
tribute to the challenged policy, the court held: "When the economic 
self-interest of the boycotting group and its proffered justifications merge 
181. Id. at 458-59 (citations omitted). 
182. See Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465, 1479 (N.D. Ill. 1987), 
a r d ,  895 F.2d 358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990). 
183. 493 U.S. 41 1 (1990). In this case, lawyers who had regularly accepted court np- 
pointments in criminal cases refused their appointments until the District of Columbia 
Council increased their compensation. This case also illustrates how quickly lnwyer 
groups will be charged under the Sherman Act when they are not cloaked in the protec- 
tive mantle of the holding of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
184. See Diane E. Pierson, Casenote, Antitrust Analyss in Uncertain Times: FTC v. 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 24 Creighton L. Rev. 125, 153 (1990). 
185. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 41 1, 
428-36 (1990). 
186. 457 U.S. 332, 354-57 (1982). 
187. 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
188. See id. at 1483. 
189. See id. at 1493. 
190. Id. (citation omitted). 
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the rule of reason will seldom be satisfied. When, however, the justifica- 
tion for the boycott is closely related to a lawful purpose the rule of rea- 
son will generally be ~atisfied."'~' The court went on to say that "even if 
evidence existed in the record to support the asserted justification . . . it 
must be shown that the means chosen to achieve that end are the least 
restrictive a~ailable."'~~ 
The medical antitrust cases do not stand alone. In cases involving 
other occupations, the courts have found violations of the Sherman Act 
in instances where professional rules prohibited business affiliations 
outside the profession.lg3 The policies implicated in these cases are 
analogous to those applicable when lawyers exclude nonlawyers from 
certain practice arrangements. The rules prohibiting lawyers from enter- 
ing into business ventures ancillary to the practice of law operate as a 
group boycott excluding nonlawyers from competing at the same level of 
competition as lawyers. There are arguably legitimate motives for the 
rules-to enhance professionalism, protect clients and ensure ethical 
practices. The rules are also economically motivated. It suffices to say 
that the bar has suflicient market power to restrain competition. In the 
absence of state action immunity, a challenge to these practices would 
most likely result in a hding of a Sherman Act violation under a rule of 
reason analysis. 
The only case that has tackled this question using an antitrust analysis 
is Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n.lg4 In Lawline, an organization of law- 
yers and nonlawyers challenged ABA Model Code provisions enacted by 
the Illinois Supreme Court that prohibited lawyers from forming part- 
nerships with nonlawyers.lg5 The court applied the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine,'96 under which private associations will not violate the antitrust 
laws if they organize to persuade a governmental body to enact legisla- 
tion that would produce a restraint of trade.19' In Lawline, the ABA 
argued successfblly that its attempts to persuade state supreme courts to 
adopt its "model" code fell within the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.Ig8 
The defendant state officials, courts and bar associations were held to be 
191. Id at 1494. 
192. Id at 1494-95. 
193. See National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693- 
96 (1978); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628,638 @.C. Cu. 
1979); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-85 @.C. Cir. 1978). 
194. 738 F. Supp. 288 (N.D. Ill. 1990), opd, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992). 
195. 738 F. Supp. at 291. 
196. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern RR Pres- 
idents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
197. Although a group boycott may be protected under the First Amendment, purely 
economic activities may result in violation of the Shermnn Act. See Missouri v. National 
Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). 
198. See Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n, 738 F. Supp. 288,292 (N.D. Ill. 1990). off'd, 
956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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immune from antitrust liability under Parker v. Brown.199 
In Hoover v. Ronwin20" the Supreme Court took a closer look at the 
immunity of bar officials under the Parker state action exemption. Hoo- 
ver was an Arizona case concerning a state bar examiners' decision to 
deny admission to a prospective attorney who failed the Arizona bar ex- 
aminati~n.~" The applicant alleged that the examiners had conspired to 
restrain trade by artificially limiting the number of lawyers admitted to 
practice in Arizona.202 The case reached the United States Supreme 
Court after the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court order dismissing 
the complaint.203 Although the court of appeals ruled against the appli- 
cant Ronwin, the Supreme Court said that the decision turned "on a 
narrow and specific issue: who denied Ronwin admission to the Arizona 
Bar?"204 The answer to this question was that the Arizona Supreme 
Court, not the bar examiners, made the decision not to admit R~nwin.~" 
The Court distinguished City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and 
Light CO.,~O~ and Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder.207 
Both Lafayette and Boulder involved actions by municipalities that 0s- 
tensibly restrained trade. The city of Lafayette owned and operated an 
electrical utility that competed with a privately owned The 
City of Boulder enacted an ordinance imposing a three month morato- 
rium on the expansion of an existing cable television franchise where one 
company was already operating in the area.209 
In each case, the Supreme Court held that the action of the municipal- 
ity was subject to the antitrust laws. In Lafayette, the Court said that 
Parker will only exempt municipalities' anticompetitive conduct if it con- 
stitutes a state-sanctioned act that replaces competition with regulation 
or monopoly public service.210 Significantly, the court noted: "Plainly 
petitioners are in error in arguing that Parker held that all government 
entities, whether state agencies or subdivisions of a State, are, simply by 
199. See id. at 293. The wurt also summarily rejected constitutional claims raised by 
the plaintiffs. See id. at 295-96. 
200. 466 U.S. 558 (1984). 
201. See id. at 560. 
202. See id. at 565. 
203. See Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. 
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984). 
204. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 581. 
205. See id. at 578 ("Unlike the actions of the Virginia State Bar in Goldfarb, the 
actions of the [examiners] are governed by the court's Rules. Those Rules carefully re- 
serve to the court the authority to make the decision to admit or deny, and that decision 
is the critical state action here."). But aren't they really the same? In Goldfarb, the rules 
were promulgated by the bar association, but it was the Virginia Supreme Court that 
administered discipline. 
206. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). 
207. 455 U.S. 40 (1982). 
208. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 391-92. 
209. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 45-46. 
210. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413. 
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reason of their status as such, exempt from the antitrust laws."211 Com- 
paring Goldfarb and Bates, the Court emphasized that in Bates 
p]he state policy requiring the anticompetitive restraint as part of a 
comprehensive regulatory system, was one clearly articulated and af- 
firmatively expressed as state policy, and that the State's policy was 
actively supervised by the State Supreme Court as the policymaker. . . . 
m h e n  the State itself has not directed or authorized an anticompeti- 
tive practice, the State's subdivisions in exercising their delegated 
power must obey the antitrust laws.212 
In Boulder, the Court declared that the "clear articulation requirement" 
was not met by the Home Rule Amendment to the Colorado Constitu- 
tion that granted municipalities general rulemaking powers.213 Such a 
provision, therefore, was insufficient to shield the city from antitrust 
liability.214 
Thus, the Supreme Court has established that not all actions of state 
officials and subdivisions should be treated as acts of the sovereign?15 If 
the actions in question are shown to be those of the sovereign, the Sher- 
man Act will not apply. If, however, the actions do not represent clearly 
articulated state policy and are not supervised by the state,216 then the 
Sherman Act will apply. 
The question remains whether state ethical code prohibitions against 
business affiliations between lawyers and nonlawyers constitute 
state action in light of post-Bates cases such as Boulder and Lafay- 
ette. Dictum in Lafayette suggests that they do.2" A close exarnina- 
tion of Bates suggests that the rules against advertising were neither 
adopted pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace 
competition with regulation,218 nor supervised by state supreme 
211. Id at 408. 
212. Id at 410, 416. Although Goldfarb may not stand for the proposition stated by 
the Court, and Bates may not be a good example of "active supervision," it is noteworthy 
that the Court used cases involving the legal profession to illustrate its point that not all 
government acts are sovereign acts. 
213. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51 n.14 
(1982). 
214. See id at 55 ("A State that allows its municipalities to do is they please om 
hardly be said to have 'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive actions for which mu- 
nicipal liability is sought."). Boulder also reaffirmed the holding in Lo/qt.ette, which had 
been a plurality decision. 
215. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 
97, 103 (1980); Jefferson Disposal Co. v. Parish of Jefferson, 603 F. Supp. 1125, 1129-30 
(E.D. La. 1985). The principle is analogous to the traditional notion in tort law that not 
all government officials were protected with the same level of government immunity. See 
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the LOW of Torts $5 131-132 (5th ed. 
1984). 
216. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power 6r Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978). 
217. See id at 416. 
218. Nowhere in the Code or Rules (and comments thereto) is there any mention of a 
state policy to eliminate competition. At most, such a policy may be inferred, but this is 
not enough to violate the First Amendment given that a constitutional ddcgation of 
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courts.219 The majority in Hoover believed that the Arizona Supreme 
Court's ratification of the bar examiners' decision concerning admission 
of candidates was sufficient to meet the Lafayette standard.220 
In a spirited dissent, Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Blackmun and 
White, in a 4-3 decision in which Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist did 
not participate) likened present day occupational restrictions to medieval 
guilds.22' Justice Stevens recognized the potential conflict produced by 
government delegation of licensing power to private parties that have an 
economic interest in limiting admissions. He further pointed out that the 
state may avoid such a conflict by either formulating standards and ad- 
ministering procedures or delegating the job to private parties, in which 
case the policies displacing competition must be clearly and affirmatively 
expressed and appropriately supervised.222 The test in Goldfarb and 
Bates was whether the sovereign requires the restraint, and that test, ac- 
cording to Justice Stevens, was not met in Hoover.223 
If Justice Stevens' analysis were applied to the ancillary business rules, 
a question would arise as to whether these rules constitute a clearly ar- 
ticulated and actively supervised delegation of power. Although at first 
blush, these rules may be viewed as part of the same regulatory scheme 
(the ethics code) as the regulations in Bates, one could argue that ethical 
rules that impose a group boycott on nonlawyers should be afforded a 
different treatment than ethical rules that are limited to restricting com- 
petition among lawyers. Close scrutiny of post-Bates antitrust cases also 
suggests that the rudimentary treatment of the Lafayette standard in 
Bates224 does not square with the law as it has evolved. 
Far from clearly articulating state policy to restrict competition, disci- 
plinary codes neither reflect any intention to exclude nonlawyers from 
dealing with lawyers in the delivery of client services, nor contain lan- 
guage remotely suggesting authority to supervene the Sherman Act. To 
the contrary, the Scope section of the Model Rules specifically states that 
"nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal 
duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a 
Moreover, state supreme courts do not actively administer a 
power was insufficient in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 
40, 52-56 (1982). 
219. Although procedures vary from state to state, state supreme courts, in practice, 
are seldom active participants in overseeing anticompetitive policy. Rather, they oversee 
the disciplinary process as a whole. See, cg., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (establishing standard through which 
antitrust policies are "actively supervised by the state itself"). 
220. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 582 (1984). 
221. See id. at 582-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
222. See id. at 584-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
223. See id. at 590 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Here, the sovereign is the State Supreme 
Court, not petitioners, and the court did not require petitioners to grade the bar exnmina- 
tion as they did."). 
224. See Bates v. State B of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 359-62 (1977). 
225. Model Rules, supra 7 ote 7, Scope. Comparable language is contained in the 
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policy of noncompetition. They may promulgate the rules, and they may 
oversee the disciplinary system generally, but one is hard-pressed to 
characterize such activity as active supervision of the state's policy of 
noncompetition in accordance with Lafayette and B o ~ l d e r . ~ ~  For these 
reasons, the state action exemption should not apply to the rules restrict- 
ing lawyers' ancillary business activities, and the rules should be treated 
no differently than similar rules in other professions. 
B. First Amendment Considerations 
If it is concluded that a state supreme court's promulgation of an ethi- 
cal code for lawyers falls within the scope of the Parker v. Brown exemp 
a further question arises as to whether such action confiicts with 
constitutionally guaranteed liberties. In the case of regulations that re- 
strict innovative business ventures between lawyers and nonlawyers, the 
First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States ConstitutionYus presents fundamental 
problems for any state regulation. Although this constitutional problem 
has been alluded to in the recent ABA debatesYu9 most commentators 
have not explored the question fully.230 
In order to understand the conflict between the right of lawyers to 
engage in various forms of business with nonlawyers and the state's 
power to regulate lawyers' expressive conduct involving such activities, it 
is necessary to look at the basic objectives of the First Amendment, and 
the legal doctrines that apply to lawyers that engage in commercial activ- 
ity through professional associations. It is further necessary to both eval- 
uate the nature of such activity and apply an appropriate test for 
determining whether the rules are unnecessarily broad. 
Two possible approaches may be used to challenge ethical rules that 
restrict relationships between lawyers and nonlawyers: freedom of asso- 
ciation and commercial speech. \ W e  each carries with it specific im- 
Model Code. Although this admonition is cited most often in the context of legal mal- 
practice, it may also be read to repudiate the establishment through the Rules of a state- 
sanctioned anticompetitive policy. 
226. That state supreme court justices are themselves lawyers should render them sus- 
pect for purposes of either articulating or administering an anticompetitive policy in the 
first place. To acknowledge such authority condones the foxes yarding the henhouse. 
227. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text. 
228. U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law 5 11-2, at 772 (2d ed. 1988) (" 'Many  of the rights guaranteed by the first eight 
Amendments' have been selectively absorbed into the fourteenth.") (quoting Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968)). 
229. See American Bar Association Standing Committee On Ethics And Professional 
Responsibility: Report To The House of Delegates 13 (1991) (summarizing Ethics Com- 
mittee's study of lawyers' ancillary business activities); Stnnley, supra note 22, at 31-32. 
230. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 652-55. Although Professor Andrew' analysis 
represents the most thorough review of the First Amendment attack on the business reg- 
ulations, hi conclusion that such a challenge will fail needs reexamination. See infra this 
Part. 
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pediments to a successful attack on the rules, both approaches provide 
viable alternatives to the antitrust theory and should be explored. 
The freedom of association approach argues that lawyers have a con- 
stitutional right to associate with others for the delivery of legal services, 
and that restrictions on associations with nonlawyers infringe on that 
right. Such restrictions may be viewed as falling within either of two 
paradigms.231 Under the first line of analysis, the restrictions would be 
analogized to cases in which the government has either sought to outlaw 
an association outright or punish an individual's affiliation with it.232 ES- 
tablished principles of first amendment jurisprudence233 would warrant 
that a lawyer's affiliation with a nonlawyer could not be prohibited out- 
right unless it could be shown that the resulting association "actively 
engaged in lawless conduct"234 or threatened to incite imminent lawless 
Moreover, a lawyer who affiliated with a nonlawyer could not 
be punished for such affiliation unless a prohibition of the resulting asso- 
ciation were constitutionally permissible,236 and it were shown that the 
lawyer engaged in the affiliation "with knowledge of its illegality, and . . . 
with the specific intent of furthering [the association's] illegal aims by 
such affiliati~n."~~' 
Under the second line of analysis, restrictions on lawyer affiliations 
with nonlawyers would be analogized to cases in which the "government 
makes no attempt to brand an association, or affiliation with it, as unlaw- 
ful, but nonetheless interferes significantly. . . with an activity integral to 
the association . . . as in the case of.  . . attempts to prevent labor unions 
from referring their members to union attorneys for assistance in litiga- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~ '  Under this line of analysis: 
Such governmental interference also violates the first and fourteenth 
amendments even if it is justified by a legitimate objective, such as the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest in attorney-client relationships, unless 
[the] government shows that a serious impairment of the objective 
would clearly occur in the absence of the challenged interference, and 
that no less intrusive regulation could prevent such impairment.239 
The other approach to the problem is to re-examine Bates and its prog- 
231. See Tribe, supra note 228, 5 12-26, at 1015-17. The second paradigm, see irtjra 
notes 238-39 and accompanying text, appears to be more applicable to nonlawyer affilin- 
tions than the first. See infra notes 232-37 and accompanying text. The second paradigm 
is discussed in detail, see infra Part III.B.1. 
232. See id. 5 12-26, at 1015. 
233. See id. 4 12-9, at 841-49. 
234. Id. 5 12-26, at 1015. 
235. See id. (citing Noto v. United States. 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)). 
236. See id.; supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text. 
237. Tribe, supra note 228, 5 12-26, at 1015 (citing Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 1 1  
(1966)). 
238. Id. 5 12-26, at 1016 (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex re/. Va. 
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964)). 
239. Id. 5 12-26, at 1016-17 (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State 
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223-25 (1967)). 
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eny with respect to the limits of state regulation of protected First 
Amendment rights. If affiliations between lawyers and nonlawyers can 
be construed to fit into the same class of protected expression as the com- 
mercial speech in Bates, then the same test for determining the adequacy 
of the rules should be applied. Under this test, prophylactic prohibitions 
would give way to less restrictive measures. 
In addition to the freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly and 
petition that are enumerated in the First Amendment of the Constitu- 
ti0n,2~O the Supreme Court has read the First Amendment to imply the 
rights of expres~ion,2~~ p r i~acy ,2~~  and association.243 Together, these 
rights create a powerful bulwark for the protection of individual lib- 
erty.244 Nevertheless, these rights are not absolute, and the government 
may abridge them in specific circumstances.245 
Lawyers confront a unique set of F i t  Amendment problems in their 
professional capacity. As citizens they retain the same rights as other 
citizens to speak out on issues of public concern.246 They are afforded 
the same constitutional protection as nonlawyers in the conduct of their 
private lives. At the same time, some aspects of lawyering necessitate 
restriction of the unfettered freedom of expression. Lawyers, as officers 
of the court, are subject to greater restrictions in the exercise of F i t  
Amendment rights than n~nlawyers.~~' On pain of discipline, an attor- 
ney may not reveal the confidences of her client,248 make prejudicial ex- 
trajudicial comments about a case in or disrupt the court.m 
At the same time, a citizen does not sacrifice all her First Amendment 
rights by becoming a lawyer. Accordingly, rules that prohibit affiliations 
between lawyers and nonlawyers must be addressed in light of this con- 
240. See U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish- 
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances."). 
241. See Tribe, supra note 228, § 12-1, at 785-89. 
242. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
243. See Tribe, supra note 228, § 12-26, at 1010-22. 
244. See id § 12-1, at 785-89. 
245. See, erg., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (upholding denial of access to 
military base for use as a public forum); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) 
(privilege of using streets and parks for communication of views may be regulated in the 
public interest). 
246. See U.S. Const. amend. I. 
247. Ethical Rules may prevent a lawyer from making statements to the press regard- 
ing pending cases. These rules do not violate the lawyer's First Amendment rights k- 
cause such rules implicate important state interests relating to the control over the 
professional conduct of its attorneys. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden 
State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 434-35 (1982). 
248. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.6(a); Model Code, supm note 30, DR 4- 
101@). 
249. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 3.6(a); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 7- 
107. 
250. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 3.5(c); Model Code, supm note 30, DR 7- 
106(C). 
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cern over the extent to which the government may properly restrict the 
First Amendment rights of lawyers in the conduct of their practices. 
1. Freedom of Association 
Among the rights implied in the First Amendment is the freedom of 
ass~ciation.~" Paradoxically, the freedom of association is so basic that 
the situations in which it has been raised as an independent legal issue 
have been limited. Some commentators have suggested that associational 
interests have been raised in other cases under different names.252 For 
example, the school desegregation cases may be viewed as freedom of 
association cases.253 When lawyers enter into business relationships with 
nonlawyers, rules that prohibit such arrangements are clearly infringe- 
ments on the right of association. Yet, if the state has a legitimate inter- 
est in prohibiting certain associations, the state interest must be balanced 
against the associational rights. The issue of a lawyers' freedom of asso- 
ciation has been raised in a number of cases. An examination of these 
cases will help interpret the doctrine of freedom of association as it ap- 
plies to law firm diversification. 
In a 1963 case, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. 
Virginia State Bar,254 the Supreme Court struck down a prohibition 
against a group legal services plan created by a union for the benefit of its 
members.255 Under the plan, union members could obtain specified legal 
services from lawyers on a panel selected by the union.256 The state 
claimed that the arrangement violated ethical rules that prohibited a law- 
yer from allowing a nonlawyer to direct the lawyer's independent profes- 
sional j~dgment.~" In invalidating the prohibition, the Court relied 
upon NAACP v. In Button, the Court had enjoined the en- 
forcement of ethical rules that prohibited NAACP attorneys from solicit- 
ing legal business for the purpose of identifying victims of racial 
discr irninat i~n.~~~ The principle that began with Button, namely, that 
lawyers could solicit clients in the exercise of their First Amendment 
rights, was eventually upheld in In re P r i rn~s .~~ '  Trainmen, Button, and 
251. See Tribe, supra note 228, 5 12-26, at 1010-22. 
252. See Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 
- - 
Yale L.J. 1, 3 (1964). 
253. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 
294 (1955); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 559 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1977). 
254. 377 U.S. 1 (1964). 
255. See id. at 8. 
256. See id. at 4. 
257. See id. at 6 n.10 (citing the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar 
Association, canon 35 (1938)). 
258. See id. at 6, 8 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 444 (1963)). 
259. See Button, 371 U.S. at 419, 444. 
260. 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978). 
"Free trade in ideas" means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, 
not merely to describe facts. The First and Fourteenth Amendments require a 
measure of protection for "advocating lawful means of vindicating legal rights," 
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Primus thus stand for the proposition that the protection of the F i t  
Amendment is not limited to the narrow concept of spoken and written 
words. 
In another line of cases, the Court has dealt with the denial of bar 
applications on the basis of character and fitness. In many of these cases 
the disqualified candidates were involved in politically unpopular organi- 
za t ion~.~~ '  In Baird v. State Bar of Arizona,262 an applicant was denied 
admission to the Arizona bar after having passed the written exam be- 
cause she refused to answer a question on the bar application that asked 
if she had ever been a member of an organization that advocated the 
violent overthrow of the government.263 Baird argued that the question 
required her to surmise the objectives of every organization to which she 
had belonged in the and would infringe upon her freedom to 
associate with organizations of her choice.265 In finding for Baird, the 
Court held that Baird's First Amendment associational interest was par- 
amount to the bar's power to review the character and fitness of 
applicants. 
In Hishon v. King & S ~ a l d i n g , ~ ~ ~  the Court upheld the complaint of a 
woman who was denied partnership in a prominent Atlanta law firm be- 
cause of her sex.267 Despite the fact that Hishon had been given excellent 
evaluations and reviews while working as an associate at the firm, she 
was passed over for partnership. The firm argued that the essence of a 
partnership is that partners are permitted to choose whomever they want 
as fellow partners, unfettered by Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights 
Significantly, the Court did not address the right of partners to 
associate freely through partnership election. Rather, the Court instead 
held that Hishon would be permitted to establish on remand that when 
she was recruited and hired by the firm, she was promised an equal o p  
portunity to be considered for partnership, and that such promise was a 
part of the employment contract protected by Title VII?69 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell pointed out that it would not 
be a violation of Title VII for any number of lawyers to discriminate in 
including "advis[ing] another that his legal rights have been infringed" and re- 
fer[ring] him to a particular attorney or group of attorneys . . . for assistance. 
Id (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
261. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 
154, 176 (1971); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 23435 (1957). 
262. 401 U.S. 1 (1971). 
263. See id at 4-5. 
264. See id at 7. 
265. See id at 8. Forcing an individual to make such an inquiry could hnve o chilling 
effect on the right of individuals to choose their associations if they ever hoped to practice 
law. Significantly, the question did not ask whether she personally advocated the violent 
overthrow of the government. See id at 4-5. 
266. 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
267. See id at 74, 78. 
268. See id at 78. 
269. See id at 76. 
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the formation of a partnership or in the addition of a lateral partner.270 
On the other hand, he suggested that a law firm's discrimination in the 
selection of partners from outside the firm may not be constitutionally 
protected either.271 
All of these cases suggest that lawyers possess basic First Amendment 
rights to join and form associations and express their views freely. Free- 
dom of association in many ways depends upon some other right to give 
it substance. For example, in civil rights cases such as Button, the right 
of association was subordinate to the right of free speech asserted by 
members of the association.272 Thus, an association may do the same 
things as an individual under the rubric of freedom of expression. This 
ability includes the right to associate with others in the exercise of these 
expressive rights.273 
In the landmark case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,274 the Supreme 
Court struck down, on the basis of commercial speech, a state regulation 
that banned the advertisement of legal services.275 The defendants in this 
case, Bates and O'Steen, were individual lawyers who acted through an 
association, which they called the "Legal Clinic of Bates and 
O'Steen."276 Disciplinary action was taken against the defendants be- 
cause their association advertised legal services in contravention of Ari- 
zona DR 2-101.277 
Ethical rules against advertising and solicitation appear to apply with 
equal force to both associations of lawyers and individual practition- 
e r ~ . ~ ~ ~  Thus, under the First Amendment, the law firm, as an association 
of lawyers, appears to have the same rights as an individual lawyer that 
practices alone. 
The act of associating with a particular group may contain elements of 
270. See id. at 79. 
271. "[I]nvidious private discrimination . . . has never been accorded affirmative 
constitutional protections." This is not to say, however, that enforcement of 
laws that ban discrimination will always be without cost to other values, includ- 
ing constitutional rights. Such laws may impede the exercise of personal judg- 
ment in choosing one's associates or colleagues. Impediments to the exercise of 
one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right of association pro- 
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Id. at 80 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
272. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
273. See Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1979); 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,607 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 
U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
274. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
275. See id. at 384. 
276. Id. at 385; see id. at 354. 
277. See id. at 355-56. 
278. Although the Supreme Court has protected the freedom of attorneys to nssociate 
for purposes of assembly, speech and other forms of free expression, it is not clear that the 
limits of associational freedom are coextensive with the limits of these other constitu- 
tional rights. Are there any activities engaged in by an association that would not merit 
the constitutional protection that would otherwise be afforded to an individual? Does the 
right to associate imply the freedom to do anything in the name of the association? 
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both expression and a~tion."~ The motivation for the association may be 
political or religious expression, business or economic enterprise, or 
something in between. When fundamental First Amendment rights are 
implicated, a strict scrutiny standard has been applied to state regulatory 
schemes.280 On the other hand, when purely commercial activity is in- 
volved, a less restrictive rational basis test has been employed.281 In 
cases that do not fit neatly into either extreme, an intermediate level of 
scrutiny is appr~priate.'~' In short, the Court employs a calculus under 
which there is a direct relationship between the First Amendment con- 
cerns and the burden the state carries in defending its regulations. 
In one sense, the question is simply: what type of scrutiny is required 
when state regulations prohibit lawyers from associating with nonlawy- 
ers for the purpose of providing ancillary business services to clients? 
Initially, such arrangements appear to be commercial activity, necessitat- 
ing that the state only have to show a rational basis for the prohibition. 
Upon reflection, however, it seems that the associational activity in- 
volved in these lawyer-nonlawyer enterprises contains a substantial ele- 
ment of expression.283 Accordingly, a question arises as to whether this 
expressive element changes the level of scrutiny. 
The Rules of Professional Conduct represent more than a state's com- 
mercial regulation of an industry. Rather, they have been promulgated 
by lawyers as an expression of the legal profession's duties in light of 
professional values. The Rules contain certain self-serving provisions, 
but on the whole they represent a credo, a philosophy, and, moreover, an 
expression of what it means to be a lawyer.284 In most states, this docu- 
ment is given force through its adoption by the state's highest court. In 
this sense, the Rules of Professional Conduct become a regulatory 
f~mula t ion .~~ '  
What happens when lawyers hold a different view of the profession 
279. See Tribe, supra note 228, § 12-26, at 101 1-12 (citing Citizens Against Rent Con- 
trol v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981)). 
280. See United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 585 
(1971) ("[C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a 
fundamental right within the protection of the F i t  Amendment"). 
281. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
282. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977). An intermediate scrutiny has 
also been applied in commercial speech cases involving legal advertising. See Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,637 (1985) ("There is no longer any room to 
doubt that what has come to be known as 'commercial speech' is entitled to the protec- 
tion of the F i t  Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less extensive than that af- 
forded 'noncommercial speech.' "). The very question that left no doubt in the mind of 
Justice White, troubles Chief Justice Rehnquist along with Justices O'Connor and S&. 
This raises the specter of abandonment of the commercial speech doctrine, or at les t  a 
reduced scrutiny as the makeup of the Supreme Court changes. See id. at 676 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
283. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
284. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Preamble and Preliminary Stntement. 
285. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of 
Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. Rev. 281, 284-85 (1979). 
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than the one proffered in official dogma? What if a lawyer or group of 
lawyers disagree with the party line? In Bates, the challenged law on 
advertising was clear and unequivocal.286 Yet, the Legal Clinic of Bates 
and O'Steen maintained a different philosophy for the practice of law, 
which could not be pursued under existing rules.287 Bates and O'Steen 
did not set out to break the disciplinary rules of the profession, but 
merely tried to provide routine legal services to people of moderate 
means. They also discovered that they could not sustain their practice 
without advertising.288 Even though economic considerations were in- 
volved in Bates, the seminal issue involved the free expression of an idea 
about the nature of the practice of law that could not be given force 
without violating the disciplinary rule.289 The same expressive value ap- 
pears in the ABA debate, in the statements of the ancillary business 
proponents.290 
At least one case has addressed the level of scrutiny applicable to the 
regulation of professional practice. In Garcia v. Texas State Board of 
Medical Examiners,291 the court stated the long recognized rule that it is 
within "[tlhe police power of the State . . . to enact comprehensive, de- 
tailed, and rigid regulations for the practice of medicine, surgery, and 
dentistry."292 It has been unchallenged that it is within the power of the 
state to regulate both legal and health services. According to Garcia, the 
state must balance the needs of the general public for qualified profes- 
sionals against the state's police power to regulate. Constitutional rights 
may be abridged in the process. The need to protect the public from 
unlicensed doctors is so great, that in order to outweigh this need, it must 
be clearly demonstrated that the state's exercise of power is unreasona- 
ble.293 Thus, the court found a rational basis for preventing a nonphysi- 
cian from running a medical corporation: it would prevent abuses 
resulting from lay-person control and preserve the doctor-patient 
relationship.294 
The dangers of lay control of a medical corporation are arguably 
stronger than the risks inherent when a nonlawyer associates with a law- 
yer. This is primarily due to fact that lawyers will retain control over 
286. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 355 (1977). 
287. See id. at 354. 
288. See id. 
289. See id. at 383-84. 
290. See Jones, supra note 21, at 684-85,688. In fact, the politicnl nature of the debnte, 
the forum in which the ideas are being discussed, and the process by which compromise 
has been achieved lead inexorably to the conclusion that this is the very type of robust 
debate on issues of public concern that the First Amendment seeks to foster. If, as enrlier 
suggested in this Article, the proponents and opponents represent different visions for the 
future of the legal profession and the delivery of legal services, the First Amendment 
component of lawyer-nonlawyer ventures is very high. 
291. 384 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 421 U.S. 995 (1975). 
292. See Garcia, 384 F. Supp. at 437. 
293. See id. 
294. See id. at 440. 
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legal services.295 It may also be argued that there is less of an expressive 
element in the prohibition found in Garcia than in lawyer-nonlawyer 
ventures. Underlying this argument is the fact that the medical services 
provided through the corporation in Garcia did not differ From those pro- 
vided by a doctor-operated enterprise; the only difference between the 
two enterprises related to the control of the corporation. It may be fur- 
ther argued that the state's interest in protecting human life is greater 
than its interest in protecting individuals' economic and legal interests. 
Consequently, a strong case can be made that the holding in Garcia 
should not be applied to the legal profession. 
In I n  re 1115 Legal Service Care,296 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
considered whether a non-commercial, internally staffed, prepaid legal 
service plan violated ethical rules because nonlawyers acted as trust- 
e e ~ . ~ ~ '  Under New Jersey rules, practicing law within this type of organi- 
zational structure was not permitted on the theory that when nonlawyers 
are in control of a legal corporation, they might be in a position to direct 
the rendition of legal services, and place their own interests ahead of 
those of the clients. The court found an exception to this rule, which is 
applicable provided that clients' interests predominate and nonlawyer 
trustees are kept from exercising professional judgment and involvement 
in individual cases. 
If groups of persons combine for valid economic, social, or other rea- 
sons not inconsistent with public policy and seek in conjunction with 
their mutual interests to provide legal services to their constituency, we 
see no supervening interest bearing on the regulation of the legal pro- 
fession that should militate against such efforts.298 
Thus, the court found that this type of legal service plan served an im- 
portant and useful function by providing needed services, and held that 
the rules should be revised to allow such organizations to engage in the 
practice of law.299 
Other cases have reached a similar result.3w In NAACP v. Button,3o' 
the Court considered whether a regulation that restricts lawyer referrals 
and recommendations unduly limits protected freedom of a~soc ia t ion .~  
295. The facts in Garcia indicate that the board of directors of the medid corporation 
contained no doctors at all. See id at 436. 
296. 541 A.2d 673 (N.J. 1988). 
297. See id 
298. Id at 676. 
299. See id at 677. 
300. See, eg., In re Education Law Ctr., Inc., 429 A.2d 1051, 1059 (NJ. 1981) (pro- 
viding an exception to treatment as the unauthorized practice of law where the corpora- 
tion operates for charitable and benevolent purposes). But see Florida Bar v. 
Consolidated Business & Legal Forms, Inc., 386 So.2d 797, 798-99 (Fla 1980) (denying 
exception to treatment as the unauthorized practice of law); Cuyahogn County Bar Ass'n 
v. Gold Shield, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1232, 1236-37 (Ohio 1975) (no exception to treatment as 
unauthorized practice of law). 
301. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
302. See id 
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Although the state claimed that this situation fell within the traditional 
purview of state regulation of professional conduct, the Court held that 
only a compelling state interest in regulating particular conduct could 
justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.303 The Court further held 
that in order to justify broad prohibitions, the state must establish a sub- 
stantial regulatory interest by proving that the feared evils will result if 
the conduct is all~wed.~" It is not sufficient to infer that there will be 
injurious intervention in, or control of, litigation without specific allega- 
tions and proof on the re~ord.~" Since the NAACP shared the same 
aims and interests as its members and clients, there was little risk of 
harm.306 The regulation infringed on the right of the NAACP, its mem- 
bers and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who 
seek legal redress for infringements of constitutionally protected 
rights.307 Although Button involved the exercise of protected First 
Amendment rights by citizens who were represented by lawyers, at the 
heart of the case was the mechanism for the delivery of legal services. If 
NAACP attorneys could not reach out to potential victims of discrimina- 
tion, the type of class action litigation contemplated by the legal staff 
would be much more difficult to pursue. It follows that Button stands for 
the proposition that lawyers have a right of association for the purpose of 
forming and utilizing legal service delivery systems to meet the needs of 
potential clients. 
The same idea resurfaced in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Vir- 
ginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,308 in which the Supreme Court upheld a 
labor union's right to operate a group legal services plan.309 Trainmen 
relied on the holding in Button, although the union and its members were 
not seeking redress of constitutional grievances. In both cases, an inno- 
vative service delivery system was upheld despite the arrangement's vio- 
lation of ethical rules. In fact, Trainmen deals specifically with a practice 
delivery system involving both lawyers and non la~yers .~ '~  
Although there are associational interests at issue in these cases, their 
pure First Amendment aspects make it hard to generalize in applying 
their holdings to the commercial setting. The problem of commercial 
303. See id. at 438. 
304. See id. at 444. 
305. See id. 
306. See id. at 443. 
307. See id. at 433 ("Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to sur- 
vive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity."). 
308. 377 U.S. 1 (1964). 
309. See id. at 8. 
310. The bar's response was to graft a grouy! legal services exception to the ethical 
rules. See Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2-103@)(4). The rambling regulation was 
eliminated as unnecessary by the framers of the Model Rules. Ironically, almost all the 
charges that have been levied at ancillary business activities by law firms can be, and have 
been, directed at group legal services. Furthermore, after almost three decades of legiti- 
macy, there is no evidence that unprofessional conduct is any more prevalent in group 
legal services plans than in law firms engaging in private practice. 
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association is not a new one. In Roberts v. United States JayceesYJ1' the 
Supreme Court held that male members' freedoms of intimate or expres- 
sive association were not abridged through the application of a Minne- 
sota human rights act that required the admittance of women 
members.312 For purposes of First Amendment analysis, the Court dis- 
tinguished the idea of freedom of intimate association in one's personal 
and family relationships, from the idea of expressive association.313 With 
respect to expressive association, the Court stated: 
[Wle have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activi- 
ties protected by the Fit Amendment a corresponding right to associ- 
ate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends. . . . 
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, abso- 
lute. Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations 
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppres- 
sion of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means signiticantly less 
restrictive of associational freedorn~."~ 
The Court then held that Minnesota's compelling interest in eliminating 
discrimination against female citizens justified the infringement of male 
members' associational freedoms.315 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in IDK, Inc  v. County of Clark,316 held 
that the operators of an escort service could not claim the protection of 
expressive association because escort services were primarily commercial 
rather than comm~nicative.~~' Other cases have recognized that 
although an activity may be commercial in nature, it is not automatically 
excluded from First Amendment pro tec t i~n .~ '~  Thus, both corporate 
speech and association merit protection if First Amendment values are 
implicated. Commercial activity, however, would not be protected if 
First Amendment values are not implicated. In the context of legal serv- 
ices, this means that law firms and other legal services providers deserve 
the same consideration for their expressive conduct that individuals re- 
ceive. The issue thus becomes one of delineation between activities that 
are expressive and those that are commercial. 
31 1. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
312. See id at 623. 
313. See id at 619-20. 
314. Id at 622-23. 
31 5. See id at 623. 
316. 836 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1988). 
317. See id at 1194-95 (despite the obvious "communication" in dating. an othenvise 
commercial enterprise cannot secure constitutional protection simply by calling an activ- 
ity "expressive"). 
318. See, cg., Paciiic Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. CommVn, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 
(1986) (holding that utility was not required to allow consumer group to use space in its 
newsletter); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978) (criminal 
statute that prohibited banks and other corporations from making expenditures to influ- 
ence voting represented an unconstitutional abridgement of corporate free speech). 
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In In re National Store Fixture Co. ,319 the court examined a regulation 
that prohibited the appointment of persons associated with a relative of a 
bankruptcy judge to the position of trustee in the same court where that 
judge sits.320 The court, employing a rational basis test, balanced the 
legitimate government interests promoted by the regulation against the 
personal rights being threatened.321 Noting that the rule created an ir- 
rebuttable presumption that the appointment of trustees associated with 
a relative of a bankruptcy judge would cause both judges and lawyers to 
lose their integrity, the court stated that such presumptions are not ap- 
propriate when more precise tests are available. The regulation violated 
the constitutional right of association because it created an irrebuttable 
presumption although safeguards already existed.322 Attorneys may 
move to disqualify a judge if fairness becomes an but there is no 
need to prohibit the appointment of a trustee simply because of the 
trustee's associations. 
National Store demonstrates that regulations infringing on the freedom 
of association may fail the scrutiny of the rational basis test. Button and 
Trainmen recognize that associational interests may reach a higher level 
implicating the strict scrutiny test. Under either test, the state is not free 
to impose prohibitions on lawyers' associations without valid reason, and 
any regulatory scheme is subject to review under the appropriate test.324 
In the search to identify some guiding principles, it might make sense 
to allow associations between lawyers and nonlawyers, while enforcing 
existing disciplinary rules that address specific evils. Additional rules 
could be promulgated as they become necessary. Courts have generally 
not upheld regulations that make an irrebuttable presumption that evils 
may Associations between lawyers and nonlawyers have been 
banned because of fears that the nonlawyer may control litigation,326 vio- 
late the attorney-client privilege,327 or undermine professional stan- 
d a r d ~ . ~ ~ ~  These evils, if they occur, certainly would be injurious to the 
public. Because the courts, in other contexts, have required proof that 
evils will inevitably occur,329 there should be no absolute ban on associa- 
319. 37 B.R. 481 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984). 
320. See id. 
321. See id. at 487. 
322. See id. at 488-89. 
323. See id. at 487. 
324. In other cases, the courts have been unwilling to strike down requirements im- 
posed upon bar applicants. See, e.g., Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(upholding mandatory bar membership), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989), rev2 Levinc v. 
Supreme Court of Wis., 679 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wis. 1988); Nordgren v. Hafter, 616 F. 
Supp. 742 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (upholding requirement of graduation from an ABA-ap- 
proved law school), aff'd, 789 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986). 
325. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (invalidating disci- 
plinary rule that prohibited advertisements by lawyers). 
326. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 605. 
327. See id. at 614. 
328. See id. at 628-29; supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. 
329. See I n  re National Store Fixture Co., 37 B.R. 481, 489 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) 
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tions with nonlawyers. Prophylactic rules create an irrebuttable pre- 
sumption of harm. Other ethical rules provide a more precise means of 
counteracting these evils in the context of lawyers' actions.33o The ethi- 
cal rules should be understood to govern lawyers' conduct in their as- 
sociations with n ~ n l a w y e r s . ~ ~ ~  If a lawyer puts profit ahead of 
representation, or otherwise fails to represent a client competently, disci- 
plinary actions may be brought against the attorney. Enforcement of ex- 
isting rules should be adequate to permit associations with nonlawyers 
while still protecting the client.332 
Because of its commercial nature, the typical law practice may not 
deserve the same degree of constitutional protection that the Court af- 
forded the practice arrangements in Button and Trainmen. Nevertheless, 
law firm diversification represents more than ordinary business activity. 
There are political ramifications to the ancillary business debate that go 
directly to the questions of what it means to be a competent lawyer, how 
clients should be represented, and what systems can best provide legal 
services.333 In a larger sense, all legal representation involves some form 
of defense or vindication of the rights of clients, a role that has been 
recognized as a fundamental right in the criminal context.3M Accord- 
ingly, all restrictions on lawyers' ability to form associations to provide 
legal services have a direct impact on client rights. For these reasons, it 
is appropriate to hold the state to a higher standard of scrutiny than the 
rational basis test.335 
(voiding Bankruptcy Rule 5002 which absolutely barred appointment of persons asstxi- 
ated with the relative of a judge of the bankruptcy court ns bankruptcy trustees More 
that court). 
330. The idea that ethical violations are more likely to occur when lawyers are in- 
volved in nonlegal businesses or associate in practice with nonlawycrs is highly specula- 
tive. The record of group legal services programs strongly suggests that there is no basis 
for an absolute ban on such associations. In-house corporate counsel also work under the 
direction of nonlawyers, but there is no record of charges that the existence of corporate 
law departments undermines professionalism. Lawyers wn be disciplined for misconduct 
whether or not they are practicing law, so the ethical rules themselves provide a strong 
incentive for self regulation by lawyers of their ancillary business activities. 
331. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Preamble, Rule 5. 
332. In fact, lawyers could have access to information in other fields, such as account- 
ing, economics, or science, in the most economically feasible and efficient way. The pres- 
ent system, under which such associations are prohibited, forces lawyers to purchase the 
expertise of consultants on the open market, at premium rates. This drives up the cost of 
legal senices and reduces the competitiveness of lawyers in the marketplace. 
333. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
334. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963). 
335. "The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well in- 
clude, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the 
restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But 
freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be in- 
fringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to 
prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully 
protect." 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 562 (1961) (Dougla, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)). 
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If expressive associations are to be regulated in the same way as 
speech, then commercial/expressive associations deserve the same level 
of scrutiny as commercial speech. Thus, the proper test should be that 
the right of lawyers to associate with nonlawyers in the delivery of serv- 
ices may only be regulated if: (1) the state can demonstrate that it has a 
substantial interest to be protected by imposing the regulation; (2) the 
regulation furthers the substantial state interest; and (3) the regulation is 
drawn no more broadly than necessary in order to carry out the state 
interest in question.336 Such a test would recognize that lawyers do not 
have unfettered power to do whatever they want in the name of the First 
Amendment. At the same time, it would acknowledge that the state does 
not have unfettered authority to regulate associational interests. 
In the context of this Article, state regulation appears in the form of a 
professional disciplinary code.337 Regulations that govern lawyers' pro- 
fessional associations deserve special scrutiny. These regulations place a 
number of significant restrictions on the right of lawyers to freely associ- 
ate with nonlawyers. For example, a lawyer may not enter into a part- 
nership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities constitutes the practice 
of In addition, a lawyer may not split a fee with a n ~ n l a w y e r , ~ ~ ~  
or accept employment in a case if his or her independent professional 
judgment may be directed by a n ~ n l a w y e r . ~ ~ ~  Moreover, a lawyer may 
not assist a nonlawyer to engage in the unauthorized practice of law.j4' 
In looking at these rules, it is necessary to identify the substantial state 
interest involved. If there is a substantial state interest, do the rules fur- 
ther that interest, and are they sufficiently narrow? A rule may in fact 
prohibit conduct in furtherance of the state interest, but if it also prohib- 
its conduct that does not implicate the state interest, the rule may be held 
unconstitutional. 
The history of the organized bar's involvement in the area of legal ad- 
vertising suggests the need to look carefully at the regulatory scheme 
governing business ventures with nonlawyers. The bar's approach to the 
question of advertising was to adopt a prophylactic rule prohibiting all 
336. This proposed test parallels the Central Hudson Gas test. See infra note 374 and 
accompanying text. This test was first articulated in the context of legal services in In re 
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (citing Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n. 447 U.S. 557. 566 (1980)). 
337. Both the Model ~ o d k  and the ~ o d e l  Rules govern lawyers' conduct in a wide 
variety of situations: dealings with clients, other lawyers, the courts, each other, and the 
outside world. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Preamble; Model Code, supra note 30, 
Preamble. 
338. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.40); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3- 
103. 
339. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3- 
102. 
340. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(c); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 5- 
107(B). 
341. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.50); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3- 
lOl(A). 
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advertising.342 After Bates, many states adopted extensive "laundry list" 
regulations prohibiting all manner of conduct involving communications 
with potential clients.343 In In re R.M.J.,% the Supreme Court sent a 
message that such comprehensive regulations were impermissible.34s 
Thereafter, the various state codes of professional responsibility and the 
new Model Rules of Professional Conduct attempted to focus on the hn- 
damental state interest in preventing false, deceptive and misleading 
communications about legal services.346 These new rules, nevertheless, 
continued to prohibit broad classes of communication without consider- 
ing the effect of these communications on the state interests7 Thus, in 
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar A~s 'n ,~~*  the Supreme Court held unconstitu- 
tional that state's rule prohibiting the use of targeted direct mail promo- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  Moreover, in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disc@linary 
Committee of I l l inoi~,~ '~ the Court overturned a rule that prohibited the 
advertising of a legal specializationPs' Throughout the advertising 
drama, bar associations consistently drafted regulations as broadly as 
possible, and failed to recognize the Supreme Court's clear message that 
imposed limits on their own regulatory power.3s2 
The present rules establish a blanket prohibition against associations 
with nonlawyers without examining the state's interest in proscribing the 
conduct. Moreover, these rules do not consider whether such interest is 
furthered, and ignore whether they sweep unnecessarily broad. An ex- 
amination of the rules in question indicates that in this area, as in adver- 
tising, the bar has failed to meet the constitutional test.3s3 Even if the 
state can show that it has legitimate interests, it is not at all clear that the 
342. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz, 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977) ("mhe disciplinary rule 
[prohibiting advertising] serves to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and to 
keep the public in ignorance"). 
343. See Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2-101(A). 
344. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
345. See id at 207. The Court stated that "although the States may regulate commer- 
cial speech, the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that they do so with m e  and 
in a manner no more extensive than reasonably necessary to further substantial inter- 
ests." Id 
346. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rules 7.1, 7.2. 
347. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.3. The rule currently prohibits in-person 
solicitation and all telephonic contact with prospective clients. At one time it also pro- 
hibited direct-mail advertising. See id cmt. at 324. 
348. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). 
349. See id at 476-78. 
350. 496 U.S. 91 (1990). 
351. See id at 107. 
352. This "misunderstanding" of the Court's meaning in the advertising saga is impor- 
tant to this discussion in two ways: first, it shows that the organized bar is not n d l y  
right when it interprets how lawyers ought to practice law; secondly, it shows that the 
Supreme Court has been williing to look behind the veneer of professionalism to strike 
down ethical rules that infringe protected constitutionnl rights. 
353. Professor Andrews persuasively demonstrates that the only meaningful justifica- 
tion for the "business canons" is economic protectionism. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 
621-22. He sounds uncannily reminiscent of the Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), as well as in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper. 
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rules against affiliations with nonlawyers further those interests. Cer- 
tainly, a less restrictive means than a blanket prohibition could be de- 
vised to further the state interest. Even if the less stringent rational basis 
test were used, economic protectionism would not be a sufficient reason 
to prohibit associations protected under the First Amendment.354 Thus, 
despite courts' reticence to strike down regulations in a number of com- 
mercial association cases, there are persuasive arguments for doing so in 
the case of ancillary businesses. 
2. Commercial Speech 
The commercial speech approach to challenging lawyer-nonlawyer af- 
filiations involves a re-examination of Supreme Court cases concerning 
the advertising of legal services. The Court has consistently permitted 
regulation of false, deceptive and misleading communications to prospec- 
tive clients concerning lawyers' availability to provide legal services, 
while striking down regulations that merely furthered the self interest of 
the legal professi~n.~~' 
This reasoning could be extended to cover activities that involve ex- 
pressive associations with nonlawyers. Such an extension of the existing 
law would recognize that the activities in question involve a broader defi- 
nition of legal advice than traditionally recognized, including the com- 
munication of information to clients in innovative ways.356 By focusing 
on the expressive element of law firm diversification, business ventures 
with nonlawyers may be viewed as alternative systems for making legal 
services available. The current prophylactic rules, like the rule prohibit- 
ing in-person solicitation of legal business, should give way to a more 
narrow regulatory scheme designed to eliminate specific evils while pro- 
tecting the expressive values of the conduct. 
Since 1977, the Supreme Court has applied the commercial speech 
doctrine to cases involving communications to prospective clients of law- 
ye r~ ,~"  rewriting the ethical rules on advertising in the process.358 As 
previously stated, the commercial speech doctrine applies to lawyer as- 
sociations as well as to individual lawyers.359 Underlying this doctrine is 
the fundamental right of individuals to band together in associations for 
commercial gain or to enhance their own collective interests. This form 
of associational conduct differs from advertising and solicitation in that it 
does not necessarily embody communication to third persons, i.e., pro- 
spective clients. Such activities, which include the formation of ancillary 
470 U.S. 274 (1985). Arguably, such parochial trade unionism has no place in the ethical 
code of the legal profession. 
354. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text. 
355. See supra this part. 
356. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
357. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 357-58 (1977). 
358. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988). 
359. See supra notes 274-78 and accompanying text. 
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businesses to provide nonlegal services to clients of the law firm, may be 
properly viewed as setting forth a philosophy about the nature of legal 
services. Under this philosophy, legal services are viewed as an expres- 
sive interest that deserves constitutional protection.360 
Since Bates was decided in 1977, there has been a gradual expansion of 
a lawyer's right to communicate that he or she is available to provide 
legal services.361 Today, all but the most offensive communications with 
prospective clients are permissible. 
The two cases that have grappled with the limits of client solicitation 
are In re P r i r n ~ s , ~ ~ ~  and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar A ~ s ' n . ~ ~ ~  These com- 
panion cases have been read to say that solicitation for pecuniary gain 
may be prohibited while solicitation in the exercise of free speech is pro- 
tected from regulation. This assessment is certainly the interpretation 
given to these holdings in the Model Rules.364 An argument can be 
made, however, that this interpretation is not necessarily warranted. 
Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Ohralik, recognized that the 
state has the power to regulate commercial activity even when speech is a 
component of the "The Rules prohibiting solicitation are 
prophylactic measures whose objective is the prevention of harm before it 
occurs. The Rules were applied in this case to discipline a lawyer for 
soliciting employment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to 
result in the adverse consequences the State seeks to avert."366 And to 
what consequences does this statement refer? The opinion goes on: 
Although . . . personal solicitation . . . may apprise a victim of misfor- 
tune of his legal rights, the very plight of that person . . . makes him 
more vulnerable to influence but also may make advice all the more 
intrusive. Thus, under these adverse conditions the overtures of an 
uninvited lawyer may distress the solicited individual simply because 
of their obtrusiveness and the invasion of the individual's privacy 
360. The difference between the two theories discussed in this At ion  l i s  & thefact 
that under an association approach, the focus is on the right of lawyers to band together 
to provide legal services. The commercial speech approach, meanwhile, extends the logic 
of previously decided cases on legal advertising to cover expressive practice arrangements 
such as ancillary businesses. 
361. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comrn'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 
103-11 (1990); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466,476-80 (1988); Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 639-49 (1985); I n  re RMJ., 455 U.S. 191, 
199-207 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Ark, 433 U.S. 350, 368-84 (1977). 
362. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
363. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
364. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3(n) (1991), reprinted in Thomas 
D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, 1992 Selected Standuds On Professional Responsibil- 
ity 97 (1992) ("A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contnct solicit profes- 
sional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no f ' y  or 
prior professional relationship when a significant motive for . . . doing so is the lawyer's 
pecuniary gain."). 
365. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
366. Id at 464 (emphasis added). 
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall raised the question of 
whether honest, unpressured commercial solicitation might not be per- 
m i ~ s i b l e . ~ ~ ~  He would allow greater restriction of in-person solicitation 
than printed advertising, but only to the degree necessary to prevent dan- 
gers attendant to the conduct.369 
The companion case to Ohralik, I n  re Primu~,~'O involved not only the 
exercise of protected First Amendment rights, but a pristine course of 
conduct in stark contrast to the lawyer in Ohralik.371 Although Primus 
may be cited for the proposition that a lawyer may solicit clients pursu- 
ant to the lawyer's First Amendment rights, no clue is provided concern- 
ing the limits of intrusiveness in this situation. The Court simply stated 
that political expression or association requires a different standard than 
commercial conduct.372 Justice Rehnquist in dissent laments: 
If Albert Ohralik, like Edna  Primus, viewed litigation "not [as] a tech- 
nique of resolving private differences," but as "a form of political ex- 
pression" and "political association," for all that appears he  would be 
restored t o  his right to practice. And we may be sure that the next 
lawyer in Ohralik's shoes who is disciplined for similar conduct will 
come here cloaked in the prescribed mantle of "political association" 
to assure that insurance companies d o  not take unfair advantage of 
policyholders.373 
Since OhraIik and Primus were decided before the application 
of the Central Hudson Gas test374 to legal advertising in I n  re 
367. Id. at 465. 
368. See id. at 476 (Marshall, J., concumng) ("I believe it is open to doubt whether the 
State's interests are sufficiently compelling to warrant the restriction on the free flow of 
information which results from a sweeping nonsolicitation rule . . . ."). 
369. See id. at 477 (Marshall, J., concumng). 
370. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
371. Compare id. at 41417 (lawyer may not be sanctioned for soliciting clients by mail 
when the solicitation is not for pecuniary gain) with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 
U.S. 447, 449-52 (1978) (lawyer may be sanctioned for soliciting clients in person when 
the solicitation is for pecuniary gain). What happens if Ohralik adopts Primus's behav- 
ior, or vice versa? 
372. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 434 ("The approach we adopt today in Ohralik, thnt the 
State may proscribe in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely 
to result in adverse consequences, cannot be applied to appellant's activities on behalf of 
the ACLU.") (citation omitted). 
373. Id. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting NAACP V. But- 
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 431 (1963)). The now Chief Justice has never been happy with 
the direction of the Court in the legal advertising area, arguing since Bates thnt there is no 
such thing as commercial speech. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 404-05 
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part). He now has sympathizers in Justices O'Connor 
and Scalia. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466,480 (1988) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
374. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). In Central Hudson Gas, the Court articulated a four-step analysis for detcr- 
mining whether commercial speech is protected: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the 
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R.M.J.,375 it would make sense to reconsider solicitation under current 
doctrine. In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar A ~ s ' n , ~ ~ ~  the Court struck down 
the portion of Rule 7.3 that prohibited direct mail advertising, a form of 
client contact only slightly less intrusive than in-person s~licitation.~" 
Although Primus appears to require the same strict scrutiny of regula- 
tions involving political expression and association as had existed before, 
Ohralik is a different matter. If the important consideration in Ohralik is 
intrusiveness rather than pecuniary gain (which may be viewed as a dis- 
tinction between commercial expression and political expression), the 
Central Hudson Gas test would seem to call for a different analysis.378 
Clearly the state has a substantial interest in preventing highly intrusive 
conduct by lawyers in obtaining clients.379 The regulatory scheme prob- 
ably furthers that interest.380 It is highly probable that the state can fash- 
ion a less restrictive formula than an absolute prohibition, for instance, 
one that focusses on the specific evil to be prevented-intrusive over- 
reaching by the lawyer.381 
It is only a short step from the expressive considerations involved in 
the advertising cases to the considerations inherent in law firm diversifi- 
cation. If we accept the notion that there is an expressive element in 
ancillary business activities, then it is necessary to balance the F i t  
Amendment rights of lawyers with the state interests present. The Cen- 
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come withim that provision, it at 
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether 
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive 
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the gov- 
ernmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces- 
sary to serve that interest. 
Id 
375. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
376. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). 
377. See id at 476 ("But merely because targeted, direct-mil solicitation presents hw- 
yers with opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban on that 
mode of protected commercial speech."). It should be further noted that direct-mail ad- 
vertising is grouped conceptually with solicitation in Rule 7.3. See Model Rules, supm 
note 7, Rule 7.3. 
378. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (citing Central Hudson Gas 6: Hec. 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
379. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978). 
380. A prophylactic rule eliminates the danger of overreaching in solicitation by ban- 
ning solicitation altogether. It also has the effect of extinguishing the lawyer's expressive 
rights inherent in that conduct. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist might not like it any 
more now than he did in his Primus dissent, many if not all forms of legal services contain 
an element of public service that implicates First Amendment rights. See In re Primus. 
436 U.S. 412, 442 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. 
381. Although Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,477,480 (1989), m y  represent 
a retreat from the Central Hudson Gas least-restrictive-mei-ins test, see 447 U.S. at 566, 
the new test, "a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective," Board of 
Trustees, 492 U.S. at 480, may still d i i l o w  a prophylactic rule where less onerous alter- 
natives are available. In the majority opinion, Justice S d i a  points out that this standard 
is different from the rational basis test. See id 
Heinonline - -  61 Fordham L. Rev. 613 1992-1993 
6 14 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW pol .  61 
tral Hudson Gas test382 provides an established calculus for ascertaining 
the legitimacy of the regulatory scheme. Utilizing this test, the absolute 
prohibitions in the rules governing affiliations with nonlawyers must fall 
to a less restrictive paradigm. Specifically, it may be argued that other 
provisions of the ethical code provide sufficient protection against the 
anticipated evils.383 In any event, absent any strong policy justification 
for the present rules other than the economic self interest of the legal 
profession, a commercial speech challenge to the existing nonlawyer affil- 
iation rules is desirable. 
This Article has reviewed recent developments concerning the ethical 
rules governing lawyers' professional affiliations with nonlawyers. The 
current debate appears intractable, and suggests that it will be difficult to 
achieve a consensus on any proposal to reformulate the rules. At the 
same time, market forces are producing with increasing regularity new 
business ventures between lawyers and n o n l a w y e r ~ . ~ ~ ~  Pressure on the 
current rules can only be expected to increase in the future. 
It is time to revisit the question of whether the rules should be chal- 
lenged in court. Under an antitrust approach, the state action exemption 
represents a serious problem because it shields the rules from attack. 
Under a First Amendment approach, the freedom of association theory 
is hampered by the possible application of a rational basis test of the 
legitimacy of the state's regulatory scheme, while the commercial speech 
theory is generally understood to apply to advertising rather than other 
forms of conduct. In each case, an extension of the existing law is neces- 
sary to successfully attack the rules. 
Under the antitrust approach, however, there are substantial questions 
concerning whether the state action exemption should apply to these 
rules. If it does not apply, the case law involving other professions will 
dictate the demise of the rules. Freedom of association and commercial 
speech theories under the First Amendment, likewise, suggest that a less 
restrictive alternative to the current prophylactic rules may be constitu- 
tionally required. 
Although challenges to the rules confront substantial obstacles, now is 
the time to press the attack. As the marketplace for legal services be- 
comes increasingly complex and competitive, lawyers need the freedom 
382. See CentralHudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566; supra note 374 and accompanying text. 
383. Many potential problems could be obviated through informed consent of the par- 
ties, adequate conflicts checks, screening devices to protect confidences, and other meth- 
ods presently utilized in the practice of law in a variety of situations. See, e.g., Nemours 
Found. v. Gilbane, 632 F. Supp. 418,428-29 @. Del. 1986) (firm will not be disqualified 
where lawyer with conflict of interest sets up a "cone of silence" and does not pnrticipate 
in the case). 
384. The image of the little Dutch boy trying to hold back the sea seems sadly suitable 
to this situation. 
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to experiment with new delivery systems in order to survive. Ethical 
rules governing conflicts of interests, candor, confidentiality and other 
matters apply to lawyers in whatever they do, and such rules, if vigor- 
ously enforced, are sufficient to protect the interests of clients, individual 
lawyers and the legal profession. We do not need and can ill-afford 
archaic rules designed merely to maintain the economic hegemony of the 
legal profession, especially when those rules have become counterproduc- 
tive to their original purpose. 
Heinonline - -  61 Fordham L. Rev. 615 1992-1993 
